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September 28, 2025: During World War II, the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAF) lost 88,119 pilots and aircrew, accounting for about 12 percent of all Army casualties. Ground forces suffered the majority of casualties. Approximately 59 percent of USAAF deaths occurred in combat, while 25,844 deaths resulted from accidents, half of which happened in the United States during pilot and crew training. In combat, 41,000 aircrew became prisoners of war, and 18,000 were wounded in action, removed from returning aircraft, and treated for their injuries.
World War II marked the last time American air forces suffered major losses. For over a century, the U.S. Air Force has advocated for military victory achieved primarily through air power. This mindset took root after World War I when the Army Air Corps, the predecessor of the independent Air Force, phased out most of its numerous reconnaissance aircraft and focused on bombers and fighters. A popular belief emerged that larger bomber aircraft would dominate future wars. This never materialized, and in every subsequent war, the Air Force had to scramble to expand its meager peacetime reconnaissance force to meet wartime realities.
This was less problematic during World War II because the Air Force was still part of the Army. However, after World War II, the Army Air Forces became the independent Air Force and sought to control everything that flew over land. This led to constant Air Force opposition to Army efforts to retain small reconnaissance and cargo aircraft. The Army valued abundant and prompt aerial reconnaissance more than the Air Force, resulting in a dispute. In the 1950s, after a decade of bickering, the Department of Defense ordered the Army to focus on helicopters while the Air Force took control of nearly all fixed-wing aircraft. The Army was allowed to retain some single-engine artillery spotter aircraft, as well as a few twin-engine transports and intelligence-collecting aircraft, but that was it.
Four decades later, in the 1990s, drones became practical and reliable for military use, and the Army and CIA quickly adopted them. Drones, lacking onboard aircrew, were not considered part of the half-century-old compromise with the Air Force. Initially, the Air Force paid little attention to drones’ growing capabilities, as it was run by pilots who assumed nothing in the air was truly useful without a pilot. The Army and CIA delivered an unexpected reality check to the Air Force. By then, the CIA was already arming its large Predator drones with Hellfire missiles.
Thus, the Army resumed operating armed aircraft in the form of drones, alongside its existing armed helicopters. The Army argued that these larger drones were more effective under the direct control of Army combat brigades. The Air Force viewed this as inefficient, preferring a centralized pool of larger drones deployed as needed. This difference of opinion reflects fundamental differences in how the Army and Air Force deploy and use their combat forces. The Army emphasizes teamwork among unit members and subordinate units within a brigade as critical to battlefield success. While the Air Force acknowledges this for its aircraft squadrons, it considers it irrelevant for Army drone use.
Seeing Army MQ-1C Gray Eagle drones conducting visual and electronic reconnaissance and firing missiles at ground targets, the Air Force fears losing control of missions it has dominated since its founding in 1947. The Army’s acquisition of thousands of reconnaissance drones did not change the Air Force’s post-war disinterest in aerial reconnaissance and surveillance. The Air Force’s reluctance to develop, build, and maintain a robust strategic reconnaissance force prompted the CIA to leverage its considerable influence and budget to develop strategic reconnaissance aircraft like the U-2 and SR-71, as well as surveillance satellites. The CIA also pioneered the use of larger drones like the Predator and armed them, helping the Army secure Department of Defense approval to expand its armed aircraft beyond helicopter gunships.
The Army retained its drones, which proved critical as the Air Force reduced spending on aerial reconnaissance with the war on terror winding down. The Air Force is purchasing fewer RQ-4 Global Hawk and RQ-170 Sentinel strategic reconnaissance drones. Every war generates unexpected weapons, techniques, and tactics. In the ongoing Ukraine War, cheap, armed drones emerged as a decisive weapon, replacing most air and artillery support and causing over 90 percent of casualties.
This led to further innovations, such as how to recruit and train operators for this new Drone Force. Ukraine eventually established its Unmanned Systems Force (USF). In 2024, Ukraine built 1.5 million drones, and in 2025, it produced more long-range drones. The USF does not control the drones regularly used by Ukrainian forces but focuses on developing new drone models and organizing mass production for successful designs. Some NATO countries are manufacturing drones of local or Ukrainian design and sending them to Ukraine. Drones have been an unexpected development with a massive impact on how battles in Ukraine are fought. Their success stems from being cheap, easily modified, and expendable.
Long-range drones enable Ukraine to strike targets deep inside Russia, including dropping guided bombs from one-kilometer altitudes, allowing bombs to glide long distances and hit Russian targets unexpectedly. This has been catastrophic for Russia, which denies the damage caused by Ukrainian drones, claiming most are shot down. However, satellite photos, FPV videos released by Ukraine, and some Russian soldiers reveal significant damage inside Russia. On platforms like WhatsApp, these attacks are sometimes shown in real time.
Both Russian and Ukrainian forces deploy quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers using FPV (First Person View) goggles to see what the drone’s day/night video camera captures. Most FPV drones carry half a kilogram of explosives, turning them into flying bombs that can fly into a target and detonate. This is a formidable and debilitating weapon when used in large numbers over the combat zone. If a target is stationary or requires more explosive power, drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, missile fire, or airstrikes. Larger, fixed-wing drones are used for long-range operations against targets over a thousand kilometers inside Russia.
A major limitation to expanding drone operations is the need for trained operators, who require dozens of hours of training before operating drones and additional hours of actual use to maximize effectiveness. Operator training begins with trainees spending weeks or months as operator assistants, monitoring the broader situation on a tablet, laptop, or desktop PC. Assistants alert FPV drone operators to new targets by indicating directions to move and launch new quadcopters after the operator expends one on the enemy.
Several FPV operators, each with two or more assistants, typically operate from a bunker or a partially rebuilt basement of a bombed-out structure. Antennas for broadcasting drone control signals and receiving FPV video are placed in camouflaged locations some distance from the operations bunker. Both sides have missiles and bombs that can home in on FPV drone control signal sources. Most operations teams maintain an off-site alternate antenna in case the primary one is destroyed. FPV drones complete their missions most of the time, whether one-way attacks or survivable reconnaissance and surveillance missions, allowing drones to be reused.
Both sides deploy enough drones to maintain constant surveillance over portions of the front line, extending a few kilometers into enemy territory. The massive use of FPV-armed drones has revolutionized warfare in Ukraine, with both sides producing as many as possible. Earlier in the Ukraine War, Russia used Iranian Shahed-136 drones, costing about $200,000 each. Ukraine demonstrated that drones with similar capabilities could be designed and built for less than a tenth of the Shahed-136’s cost. The Iranian drone was overly complex, and even Russia soon realized this, shifting to more capable drones copied from Ukrainian designs or original Russian designs.
Ukrainian drone proliferation began with individuals and small teams designing and building drones as candidates for widespread use and mass production. This led to rapid evolution of drone capabilities and uses. The side that couldn’t keep up suffered higher losses and less combat success. Each month, over a hundred thousand drones are built in Ukrainian factories or home workshops. Military leaders in other nations have taken note and are equipping their forces with drones. Lacking sufficient drones to match an enemy’s numbers in a given area puts forces at a serious disadvantage.
Drones continue to evolve in design and use, becoming more effective and essential. One countermeasure, electronic jamming of drone control signals, often works temporarily. Drone guidance systems are constantly modified or upgraded to counter this. Most drones have flight control software that returns jammed drones to their takeoff point for later use. Jammers on the ground can be attacked by drones programmed to home in on jamming signals. A common countermeasure is controlling drones via fiber-optic cables.
Ukrainians benefit from material and intellectual support from NATO countries. Ultimately, the winner at any stage of the war is the side that is most resourceful and innovative. This process has been evident in warfare for centuries, but in the last century, changes and innovations have occurred so rapidly that the process is visible, disrupting long-established missions of military services.
Israeli forces now use drones similar to those in Ukraine. The United States is equipping its infantry with more drones for reconnaissance and attack. American troops began using drones over twenty years ago but not FPV drones, a recent innovation. U.S. forces are now adopting FPV drones and learning to use them due to their heavy use in Ukraine. Drones have been an unexpected development with a massive impact on how battles in Ukraine’s current war are fought. Their success stems from being cheap, easily modified, and expendable. FPV drones are a key element in the rise of drone warfare as a dominant form of combat. Both sides release pictures and videos of FPV drone attacks on social media, revealing the horrified expressions on soldiers’ faces as the FPV drone that kills them closes in.