March 10, 2025: Ukraine has used American made drones. Until 2025 it accepted locally hade drones from the United States and other NATO nations. Now Ukraine politely declines offers and points out that they are the premier developers and manufacturers of military drones. Currently Ukraine can produce about four million drones a year.

American attempts to adopt Ukrainian drone tactics and technology encountered problems. First, the U.S. is not at war and the military bureaucracy has a peacetime attitude towards any new technology. This includes the use of drones in Ukraine and the flood of practical experience and solutions passed by Ukraine. Current U.S. Army drones, when used in Ukraine, often encounter problems the Ukrainian drones don’t. In a wartime situation, Ukrainians have been quick to make changes until they get the results they need.

The American military may want to implement the lessons of drone use in Ukraine, but American defense contractors and manufacturers feel compelled to modify and improve what the Ukrainians have done while they adapt Ukrainian drone tech to something new which United States forces can use and Congress will pay for. This process tends to lower the effectiveness of what the Ukrainians have created, while delaying the product and enriching the contractors and manufacturers. The lesser effectiveness is usually revealed the first time American troops use the U.S. version of Ukrainian drone tech. Something is lost in the tech translation. This is nothing new. It’s been happening for over a century.

The U.S. is currently adapting and adopting Ukrainian drone technology. There will be modifications and upgrades for as long as the fighting in Ukraine lasts. These changes come quickly in wartime and always have. In Ukraine, drone designs can be changed in less than a week. This is usually because the Russians gained an edge with one of their recent tweaks. While Ukraine has been in the forefront of developing and upgrading drone technology, the Russians have kept up. In war time you either keep up or become an inept underdog that falls farther and farther behind. The Russians noticed that when they fail to keep up, they suffer heavy losses.

The peacetime American military has no such wartime feedback loop. If someone in the defense procurement establishment says the current American drone tech is good, it is officially adequate. Sending U.S. drone adaptations to Ukraine for testing is done, but often over the objections of some U.S. manufacturers. When tested in combat, some of the U.S. drones fail to deliver. American defense contractors don’t like that, but their usual response is to get Congress to approve things that don’t work. When the Ukraine war ends, there will be no way to adequately test American drones. There may be other wars where American troops are involved and able to test the new drones. But it won’t be in the intensely competitive atmosphere the Ukrainians and Russians have created.

Ukraine has been writing the book on drone technology since 2023, with Russia contributing edits in real time. When that atmosphere is not present, the speed of developing new tech or maintaining current drones slows down a lot. This process is at work now as the U.S. Army orders drones based on Ukrainian designs. The American military procurement bureaucracy is infamously slow in adopting and manufacturing new weapons. It is feared that the Ukrainian drone revolution will be equally slow in actually reaching Americans soldiers and marines. Many military and Defense Department civilians are aware of this problem and see the drone development and procurement program as an opportunity to show that the United States can do it right and quickly.

There have been other Ukrainian innovations. In early 2024 Ukraine created a new branch of their military, the Unmanned Systems Force or USF. This is in addition to the Ukrainian Air Force that consists of manned aircraft. The USF does not control the drones Ukrainian forces use regularly, but instead contributes to developing new drone models and organizing mass production for those new models that are successful. The U.S. military took note of this but acting on it takes a lot longer for a peacetime military.

Drones were an unexpected development that had a huge impact on how battles in Ukraine's current war are fought. Drones were successful because they were cheap, easily modified, and expendable. Modifications and upgrades could be implemented quickly and cheaply. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces were soon using cheap, often $500 or less, quadcopter drones controlled by soldiers a few kilometers distant using FPV/First Person Viewing goggles to see what the day/night video camera on the drone can see. Most of these drones carry half a kilogram of explosives, so it can instantly turn the drone into a flying bomb that can fly into a target and detonate. Some drones carry more explosives depending on what is needed to deal with a target.

These drones are awesome and debilitating weapons when used in large numbers. If a target isn’t moving or requires more explosive power that the drones can supply, one of the drone operators can call in artillery, rocket, or missile fire, or even an airstrike. Larger, fixed wing drones are used for long range, often over a thousand kilometers, operations against targets deep inside Russia.

A major limitation to the expansion of drone operations was the need for trained drone operators. These operators need over a dozen hours of training before they are able to operate these drones at peak effectiveness. As operators spend more hours operating drones in combat, the number of new lessons learned and applied increases.

The small drones are difficult to shoot down until they get close to the ground and the shooter is close enough, as in less than a few hundred meters, away to successfully target a drone with a bullet or two and bring it down. Troops are rarely in position to do this, so most of these drones are able to complete their mission, whether it is a one-way attack or reconnaissance and surveillance. The recon missions are usually survivable and enable the drone to be reused. All these drones are constantly performing surveillance, which means that both sides commit enough drones to maintain constant surveillance over a portion of the front line, to a depth, into enemy territory, of at least a few kilometers.

This massive use of FPV-armed drones has revolutionized warfare in Ukraine and both sides are producing as many as they can. Russia initially produced its own drones now after briefly using imported Iranian Shahed-136 drones that cost over $100,000 each. Ukraine demonstrated that you could design and build drones with similar capabilities at less than a tenth of that. The Iranian drone was more complex than it needed to be and even the Russians soon realized this and turned from the Shahed-136 for more capable drones they copied from Ukrainian designs or ones Russians designed.

Ukrainian drone proliferation began when many individual Ukrainians or small teams designed and built drones. The drones served as potential candidates for widespread use and mass production. This proliferation of designers and manufacturers led to rapid evolution of drone capabilities and uses. Those who could not keep up were less successful in combat and suffered higher losses.

Military leaders in other nations have noted this and are scrambling to equip their own forces with the most effective drones. Not having enough of these to match the number the enemy has in a portion of the front means you are at a serious disadvantage in that area. These drones are still evolving in terms of design and use and are becoming more effective and essential.

One countermeasure that can work for a while is electronic jamming of the drones’ control signal. Drone guidance systems are constantly modified or upgraded to cope with this. Most drones have flight control software that sends drones with jammed control signals back to where they took off from to land for later use. The jammers are on the ground and can be attacked by drones programmed to home in on the jamming signal. Countermeasures can be overcome and the side that can do this more quickly and completely has an advantage. That advantage is usually temporary because both sides are putting a lot of effort into keeping their combat drones effective on the battlefield.

The emergence of drones as a new, novel, and decisive form of air power is the most recent of similar events that took place during the last century. During the last century the U.S. Air Force has advocated military victory achieved mainly with air power. This attitude took root after the 1914-19 World War I when the Army Air Corps, predecessor of the USAF, got rid of most of its numerous reconnaissance aircraft and concentrated on bombers and fighters. Then came the popular belief that larger bomber aircraft would dominate future wars. This never came to pass and, every time there was a war, the air force had to scramble to expand its meager peacetime reconnaissance force to meet the realities of war.

This was not so bad during World War II because the air force was still part of the army but, after World War II, the Army Air Force became the independent U.S. Air Force and sought to control everything that flew over land. That meant army attempts to retain small reconnaissance aircraft and cargo aircraft were constantly opposed by the air force. The army valued prolific and prompt aerial reconnaissance more than the air force and this led to a dispute that was not settled until quite recently.

Since the late 1990s, the army was again flying armed aircraft in the form of large armed drones, in addition to the armed helicopters it has always had, the air force began to notice. The army argument was that these larger drones work better for them if they are under the direct control of army combat brigades. The air force saw that as inefficient and preferred to have one large pool of larger drones which are deployed as needed. This difference of opinion reflects basic differences in how the army and air force deploy and use their combat forces. The army has found that a critical factor in battlefield success is teamwork among members of a unit, and subordinate units in a brigade. While the air force accepts this as a critical performance issue for their aircraft squadrons, they deem it irrelevant for army use of drones.

One thing the army acquisition of thousands of reconnaissance drones did not change was the air force loss of interest in aerial reconnaissance and surveillance after each war. Air force reluctance to develop, build and maintain a large strategic reconnaissance force led the CIA to use its considerable clout and budget developing strategic reconnaissance aircraft like the U-2 and SR-71 manned aircraft and surveillance satellites. The CIA also pioneered the use of larger drones like the 1.1-ton Predator and armed them. This helped the army win permission from the Department of Defense to expand its force of armed aircraft beyond helicopter gunships.

That changed in Ukraine when the proliferation of surveillance and armed drones often replaced conventional air forces, at least for operations close to the ground and requiring more urgency to find and attack targets. This was the ultimate solution to obtaining constant close surveillance of the combat zone. With drones you not only know what goes on in the combat zone, but can quickly, often within minutes, bring in an armed drone to attack the newly discovered target. Combat drones operated by an FPV controller have offered many new opportunities on the battlefield. This includes dealing with individual enemy soldiers and persuading them to surrender to nearby Ukrainian soldiers or else. How one of these events played out was captured on video and the video was released to the media.