November 21, 2007:
A
coalition of conservatives and reformers have curbed much of what the radicals,
as represented by president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have attempted to do. This
includes slowing down the nuclear weapons program and withdrawing support for
Shia radicals in Iraq. This shift was made possible because Ahmadinejad was not able to reform the
economy, or curb corruption. The entrenched corruption (especially of some
senior clerics, and their families) proved impossible to root out. Religion is
important in Iran, but if you really want to motivate someone, use money. And
there's a lot of oil money sloshing around, with the oil selling for over $90 a
barrel.
The coalition
against Ahmadinejad has fact and logic
on its side, and numbers. Ahmadinejad
may still have the advantage when it comes to scary headlines, but his
opponents know how the economy and banking systems work, both inside and
outside Iran. The next few rounds of international sanctions will cost Iran
billions of dollars, and make life harder for the people, as well as the
bureaucrats. Ahmadinejad can blow this
off in public, but in meetings with other senior officials, he has to back down
in the face of dire prospects.
In Iraq, Ahmadinejad also had to back down in his
support of radical Shia factions there. It became obvious that Iranian
religions fanaticism only appealed to a small minority of Iraqis, and any
attempt to push Iranian radicalism there was creating resistance. More
pragmatic Iranian leaders convinced
Ahmadinejad that long term relations with a Shia dominated Iraq were at
risk because of his policy of supporting Shia radicalism inside Iraq. So
earlier this year, it was agreed to cut a deal with the Americans and withdraw
the support for Shia radicals inside Iraq. This included cutting back arms
smuggling, and the use of Iranian military experts to train Iraqi Shia terrorists.
In return, the British and American would stop presenting embarrassing evidence
of Iranian meddling in Iran, and withdraw the commando raids that have been
doing deeper and deeper into Iran, looking for arms smugglers and Iranian
troops.
Many Iranian leaders
believe that the West would, and could, attack Iran. The ease with which Israel
hit a Syrian nuclear research facility two months ago, and the obvious skill of
American forces across the border in Iraq, plus the knowledge that Iran's
military capabilities are rather puny, by any standard, has frightened most of
the Iranian leadership. Ahmadinejad
talks brave, but he is pretty much alone. It's been the Iranian custom, for
thousands of years, to plan things carefully, and carry them out methodically. Ahmadinejad is the one who is acting
"un-Iranian" with all his glib talk to bold measures and quick
action. Iran did not become a regional superpower with that kind of stuff.
Ahmadinejad's enemies
know that if they keep quiet and move relentlessly, they can import Russian and
Chinese warplanes, and other weapons, to replace the current motley array of
armaments. Ahmadinejad has no better
plan for rearmament, and knows that this sort of thing has to be done quietly,
so as not to scare the Russians and Chinese off. Every time Ahmadinejad pops off, Chinese and Russian
diplomats feel faint. Ahmadinejad has
also become aware that he cannot even trust a lot of the people working for
him. Ahmadinejad represents a minority
attitude in Iran, and many presidential aides pretend to be loyal, but are
quick to work against the president.