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Religious Rulers Resisting Reality

June 7, 2023: Iran openly opposes any peace with the West because of Western insistence that Iran first cease its support for violence in Iraq and Syria as well its nuclear-weapons program. Iranian forces in Iraq seek to dominate the Iraqi government and its forces in Syria continue to try to establish bases for attacking Israel, while Iran officially insists it has no nuclear weapons program despite growing evidence that the nuclear weapons efforts continue. Iran is open about its plans to eventually destroy Israel with ballistic missiles carrying “powerful” warheads. Israel says it will carry out airstrikes against Iranian nuclear weapons facilities if it appears Iran is close to having such weapons. There is ample evidence that the nuclear program exists and much of the work is done at the Natanz underground facility 225 kilometers south of Tehran. Israel has successfully attacked Natanz several times in the last few years. Iran responds by repairing the damage and expanding the nuclear facilities deeper underground. In early 2021 there was an explosion at the Natanz nuclear fuel enrichment facility. The government first denied this but later admitted the attack took place and did major damage to their new high-performance nuclear enrichment (turning uranium into weapons grade material) equipment. There was massive equipment failure and damage on a scale similar to the 2010 attack carried out with software designed to get into the Natanz nuclear fuel enrichment compound, which was well guarded. Later analysis indicated that the deep-underground (about 50 meters, or 155 feet) plant was effectively destroyed. The target was the thousands of centrifuges that turn uranium ore into nuclear fuel or, with more effort, nuclear material suitable for a nuclear explosive. Israeli hackers got to the centrifuges in 2010 via a computer worm hack called Stuxnet.

In 2021 the Israelis obtained technical details of the Natanz electrical system as well as details of the new generation of centrifuges Iran installed there. The Israeli plan was to use explosives placed and detonated where it would shut down the primary and back-up power systems when the maximum number of new centrifuges were powered up and vulnerable to severe damage if both the main power and backup power systems failed. The explosives were placed correctly and went off on time. The result was Natanz again suffered major centrifuge loss that delayed resumption of production and over a year to completely repair. Now the Americans have developed a 14 ton MOP (Massive Ordnance Penetrator) bomb designed to destroy or disable such underground facilities. MOP has a guidance system so that it lands where it will do the most damage, MOP also has a void sensor that will detonate the bomb when it enters an underground facility after smashing through earth and concrete. For this reason, Iran has expanded the Natanz facility deeper underground. That does not prevent Natanz from being attacked by several MOPs that destroy the four access tunnels needed to enable personnel and material to get in and out of the underground facility.

Iranian support for Russia in Ukraine, especially supplying Russia with weapons, has made it easier for Israel to justify attacks on Iran, including air strikes. Iran has now claimed to have developed Fattah, a hypersonic missile with a range of 1,400 kilometers and the ability to evade Israeli defenses against long range missiles. Iran frequently makes claims like this about new weapons that are more aspirational than actual. Russia has hypersonic missiles and used them in Ukraine. Russians were surprised when Ukraine found a way to use their new American Patriot systems to shoot down hypersonic missiles. Iran insists that Fattah performs more effectively than Russian hypersonic missiles. An Israeli airstrike would be wide-ranging and include a wide variety of targets, including factories that produce ballistic and hypersonic missile components.

Inaction On Poverty

Many Iranian leaders believe that an uprising is possible if the religious dictatorship does nothing or tries to suppress the continuing protests against poverty and violent suppression of protests. That kind of suppression is increasingly less effective and members of the religious establishment and some IRGC leaders openly express concern that a more serious uprising is possible and whoever wins, Iran loses. So far, a majority of the senior clerics in the Guardians Council oppose any concessions to those demanding economic reforms and an end of lifestyle rules. IRGC leaders are less eager to oppose any concessions. Many IRGC leaders are closer to the protests and have a better sense of how angry Iranians are and how far most Iranians are willing to go. The IRGC is not large enough to take on most Iranians and many individual IRGC men are not willing to slaughter a lot of fellow Iranians to keep corrupt religious and IRGC leaders in power. The continued economic sanctions make life difficult for more Iranians who are unemployed and cannot afford the higher food prices.

Supporting Smuggling

Iran has growing problems with international efforts to disrupt Iranian smuggling efforts. For example, in 2018, the multi-national ECC (Enforcement Coordination Cell) was created. Initial members were the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Britain, France, South Korea, and Japan. The ECC is enforcing the UN sanctions approved at the end of 2017 to curb North Korean smuggling related to items needed for their nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In addition, the ECC allowed member nations to also enforce whatever other sanctions or naval missions their government put a priority on. The U.S. has since invited India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines to join and assist with monitoring growing Chinese violation of offshore water rights, especially in the South China Sea and other areas of the West Pacific.

The ECC concentrates on the 2,000-kilometer-long shipping lane from the Indian ocean, through the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea to North Korea. Along this route there are not only North Korean flagged ships participating in smuggling, but even more Chinese, Taiwanese, Liberian, Sri Lankan, and ships that are independent and fly whatever flag they believe will keep them from getting seized for smuggling. Earlier U.S. efforts had already identified many North Korean and Iranian owned tankers and cargo ships that were often engaged in smuggling. This led Iran and North Korea to use their own ships less and willing foreign ships instead. These third-party ships are the ones the ECC sought to identify. These ships can be identified, along with their owners and the owners can have banking and other sanctions placed on them. Many nations not part of the ECC, but economic partners with ECC members will cooperate if a smuggler ship visits one of their ports. At that point the captain can be arrested and the ship impounded.

The ECC is based on the success of Task Force 150, which came to involve twenty nations contributing ships and aircraft to deal with the Somali piracy problem. By 2012 the problem was under control but the threat and a smaller Task Force remains. As the Somali piracy problem was fading under Task Force 150 pressure, the U.S. organized another ECC to monitor and disrupt North Korea and Iran smuggling operations. This was done with the aid of the “Five Eyes”, a post-World War II intel cooperation group consisting of the U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Five Eyes intel agencies shared an unprecedented amount of intelligence on foreign threats during the Cold War and continued doing so after the Cold War ended in 1991. As international Islamic terrorism began to increase during the 1990s and especially after 2001, the Five Eyes continued to provide the member nations with much more useful intel than any of them could gather themselves. This became particularly useful as Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and adjacent seas escalated after 2012, as the size of the Chinese navy and threats it posed to most of the Five Eyes members as well as other allies like Japan and South Korea. This encouraged many nations to join or consider joining the new ECC as well as earlier counter-terrorism efforts.

Sanctions against Iranian oil exports mean that smuggled shipments not only must be sold at a discount, but that some will be seized by nations belonging to the ECC. In addition, there is less demand for oil because of a changing market. While Iran had reduced production to deal with this, they cannot reduce production enough without shutting down some wells. This costs money, as does restoring these wells to use. Iran produces more than it can sell and at one point was stuck with a stockpile of 50 million barrels of unsold oil. That stockpile has been reduced recently to about 19 million barrels. The unsold oil is usually stored in tanker ships, ready to be moved (smuggled) on short notice.

Iraq

In addition to many American contractors, Iraq also hosts several thousand American troops. These are part of an effort to reduce growing Iranian influence in Iraq. Arabs see Iran as a major troublemaker in the region. The Turks, Americans and Israelis agree and are all doing something to keep the Iranians out. The Assads in neighboring Syria are somewhere in the middle when it comes to Iran. At the moment the Assads want closer relations with its fellow Arabs, have been able to gain re-admittance to the Arab League and are negotiating with Saudi Arabia for reconstruction assistance and commercial investments.

Keeping Iran out of Iraq is complicated by the fact that lots of Iraqis have been pro-Iranian for almost twenty years, and a growing number appear to be on the government payroll via the post-2014 deal that put all PMF (Popular Mobilization Force) militias on the army payroll. Technically this meant that the PMF units had to report to senior army commanders and obey orders issued by army generals. The PMF units took the payroll cash but refused to obey army commands or requests. Each year the PMF units demanded more money from the government. This cash was deducted from the army budget. This year PMF wants nearly $3 billion. The PMF claims that this is what it needed to support about 200,000 PMF members and that number increases each year. The PMF leadership additionally contends that many of its troops will resort to violence if not paid. The PMF is composed of many groups with different and/or conflicting motives (some are even patriotic and lots more are pro-Iranian), but most are corruption scams (“ghost soldiers”). This is when large numbers of soldiers are claimed but do not exist and whoever controls the payroll and other expenses for these non-existent troops just steals the money. It is suspected that some of the ghost soldier cash going to the PMF is being diverted to Iran. This would not be the first time that cash from Iraqi corruption went to Iran, which is responsible for a lot of the corruption in Iraq.

Yemen

Iranian influence on the Shia rebels is fading and many rebel factions call for some kind of peace deal and an end to a civil war that the rebels were losing. The war continues in part because this factionalism among the rebels is something that the government and Saudis are unable to address.

Ceasefire negotiations did have some positive results, in addition to the reduced fighting plus halts to Saudi airstrikes and rebel missile attacks into Saudi Arabia. Commercial passenger and cargo flights were resumed in rebel-controlled airports. In February aid shipments resumed through the Red Sea port of Hodeida for the first time since 2016 with the arrival of the first general cargo ship which unloaded followed by the arrival and unloading of two more. The cargo delivery was made possible by the ongoing peace talks between the government and the Shia rebels. Bringing general cargo in via Hodeida was cheaper for customers in the northwest than the previous use of the southern port of Aden. This required sending the cargo north by truck.

There is still some fighting in the usual war zones; Taiz province in the south and Marib in central Yemen. The fighting is less intense than in the past. The Saudis continue to negotiate directly with the Shia rebels in order to keep the peace on the Saudi border. The peace in the Shia rebel north is partly the result of exhaustion after eight years of fighting and not much to show for it. Down south the Yemen government controls 80 percent of Yemen but has to deal with separatist southerners and Islamic terrorists. The STC (South Transitional Council) and many government troops spent the ceasefire period going after Islamic terrorist groups AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) and ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) in the south and east. A major reason for rebels agreeing to a ceasefire was a decline in Iranian support due to lack of funds plus unrest at home. The Iranian weapons, cash, advisors and smuggling network supercharged the Shia rebels, enabling them to keep fighting the more numerous and better armed force arrayed against them. Iran has been openly supporting the Shia rebels since 2014 and later admitted that less visible support had been supplied since 2011.

Eight years of civil war have revived the centuries old north-south divide. This was last “mended” in the 1990s. The possibility of a split has returned because the UAE (United Arab Emirates) has been in charge of security (and aid delivery) in the south since 2015 and supported formation of the STC. This group is composed of southern tribes that want autonomy but are willing to fight and defeat the Islamic terrorists as well as the Shia rebels first. Aidarous al Zubaidi, the STC leader, is seen as more popular in the south than any government official. The Saudis and the UAE do not agree on dividing Yemen once more but for the moment it is more convenient to support the STC and efforts to defeat the Iran-backed Shia rebels.

Information based on interceptions by American and other warships in the naval blockade of rebel-controlled coastlines indicates that Iranian smuggling of weapons to the rebels continues but at a lower intensity, and consists mainly of infantry weapons rather than cruise and ballistic missiles used to attack Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are negotiating directly with the Iranians about the fighting in Yemen and how to reduce it. This is part of an effort, brokered by the Chinese, to improve relations between the Saudis and Iran and reduce the tensions in the Persian Gulf and Yemen.

Yemen was in bad shape economically before the civil war began in 2015. Since then the situation has gotten much worse. There have been nearly 400,000 deaths, most of them caused by starvation and illness, not combat. The damage to infrastructure and lack of food led to an outbreak of cholera in 2016, which has made over two million people ill since then, killing about 4,000. Nearly fifteen percent of the population were driven from their homes. Nearly 20 million of the 24 million Yemenis have suffered hunger and/or poverty as a result of the war. Most Yemenis are exhausted by the years of privation and violence and are willing to accept peace on just about any terms.

Afghanistan

There is some international cooperation with the IEA (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) in areas of mutual interest. The most obvious one is Islamic terrorism, which is also a problem for the IEA. The primary Islamic terror threat in Afghanistan is from ISK (Islamic State Khorasan), which was formed in Afghanistan during 2015, with the help of ISIL leadership in Syria, to handle ISIL activity throughout the region (Central Asia, Iran, Pakistan and India). ISK found they were most effective if they confined their operations to Afghanistan and Pakistan, which they have been doing since 2019.

The IEA also has problems because they cannot gain any official recognition that they are the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Most nations consider the IEA a Pakistan-backed Islamic terror group that took control of the government with the additional help of Afghan drug cartels. ISK has become more active in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the IEA took over because now no one is in charge and that is ideal for ISK and the drug cartels. ISK and the cartels stay out of each other’s way because neither has anything to gain, and much to lose, by attacking each other. The cartels pay IEA to refrain from attacking drug operations, which include poppy crops and small labs that convert portions of the poppies into opium and then heroin. ISK sees no point carrying out terror attacks against the cartels because the cartels will do the same to ISK and on a larger scale. In that respect the cartels are terrorists, but only when cash does not suffice. ISK is different because they see IEA as heretics and enemies of Islam. IEA feels the same way towards ISK. Other Moslems in Afghanistan and neighboring nations regard ISK as religious zealots who defame Islam. The only relatively safe base for ISK is IEA ruled Afghanistan. Despite that, ISK attacks targets in Afghanistan, including IEA but not the drug cartels. ISK also uses its Afghan bases on the Pakistan border to carry out attacks in Pakistan. There used to be some ISK actions across the Iranian border but attacks on Iran were more costly, in terms of cash and personnel, then similar efforts against IEA and Pakistani targets. ISK also plans attacks farther away, especially in Western countries. These attacks are more risky and prone to trigger massive counterattacks. Western nations, especially the United States, continue to observe ISK operations and carry out occasional airstrikes, usually with missile armed UAVs.

The IEA has a border dispute involving access to scarce water. Drought conditions have been a problem in both countries for several years. This is in addition to Iranian complaints about the Afghan heroin smuggled into Iran to support several million addicts.

Syria

A month ago (May 4th) Syria was visited by the president of Iran reaffirming support for the Assad government. Without the $30 billion Iran spent since 2011 to keep the Assads in power, the Assads would have lost. Currently the Assad government is technically in control of 90 percent of Syria but that control is weaker than it was before 2011. There are not enough trained police and soldiers to maintain order throughout Syria, so many areas are still generally lawless and dominated by Islamic terrorists, outlaw militias and gangsters of all sorts. To survive, the Assads have to maintain relationships with the Iranians, Sunni Arabs, Turkey, Russia, Israel and the Americans.

The fighting in Syria is sharply down from the high experienced in 2014-15. Nearly 6,000 died in October 2014. About 17 percent of those dead were civilians, 15 percent from government forces and the rest from various rebel groups. ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) is believed to have suffered over 2,000 dead in October 2014, mainly because they were fighting everyone else simultaneously. The highest annual death toll was in 2014, when at least 100,000 died. Annual deaths declined after that, reaching about 3,800 in 2021 and the decline has continued to the present. This year the death toll is much lower and will probably be a few thousand for all of 2023. This includes Islamic terrorists, Syrian security forces and civilians. Last month (April) was an exceptionally bloody month with 407 deaths. That’s the highest in 14 months.

Since the civil war began in 2011 the death toll is estimated to be between 400,000 and 500,000. Iran wanted the civil war to end so they could concentrate on Israel. The key role of Iran in Syria has been noted and no one, not even Iranian allies, are cooperating with Iran. The only ones who cannot walk away from this are the Assads, Turkey and Israel.

Syrians in general and particularly the Assads are aware of the damage done to Syria by a decade of war. The best evidence of the performance of the Syrian economy is the strength of the Syrian currency. The exchange rate was 50 pounds to the dollar before the violence began in 2011. In late 2022 it was 5,000 pounds to the dollar and currently it is 7,000 pounds to the dollar. The average monthly income is under $200 a month and much of that comes from expatriates sending remittances. The loss of oil shipments from Iran is a major factor in the collapse of the economy. The change in exchange rates also reflects the failure of the Assads to make much progress in the last few years. Aid from Russia and Iran had kept the Assad government and the Syrian Air Force going. The loss of Russian and Iranian support over the last few years was catastrophic because no one else stepped up to replace that aid.

The damage is worse than most outsiders can appreciate when you take into account expected (normal) growth in the economy (GDP) and the population if the war had not happened. This data assumes a decade of some post-war reconstruction for the real Syria. In contrast, Syria without the war would have a population of 32 million by 2030. Because so many (over six million) Syrians fled the country and fewer were born (and more died) the most likely population of war-ravaged Syria by 2030 is 22 million. Most of the refugees (Sunni Arabs) do not want to return to a homeland dominated by a Shia government and occupied by Iranian (and Shia) forces. In these “war/no-war” comparisons, the economic projections show the country even worse off. Currently GDP is less than a third of what it was in 2011. But even with a decade of post-war reconstruction 2030 GDP would only be about 74 percent of what it was in 2011 and about 35 percent of what it would have been in 2030 without a war. Without the war GDP would have doubled by 2030. It is possible that Syria will grow (in terms of GDP and population) at a faster rate but that is unlikely since not a lot of nations are lining up to donate to or invest in reconstruction. In part that is due to the expected long-term presence of Iran or, even without that, the Assads would probably remain in power and still be accused of war crimes during the war. There is no statute of limitations on that sort of thing. Meanwhile the years of war have destroyed structures, infrastructure and businesses that would cost several hundred billion dollars to replace. That will be hard to do for a nation that had a 2011 GDP of about $60 billion and not a lot of natural resources other than its people and their many skills.

China recently brokered a peace deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This had nothing to do with Syria and was meant to ensure the flow of Persian Gulf oil to China. Iran was willing to behave so that it could concentrate on supporting the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Russia invaded Ukraine 14 months ago and lost what they believed would be a quick victory. Iran turned out to be one of the few nations willing and able to supply the Russians with weapons. Russia paid for this with weapons technology, including some modern Su-35 jet fighters and spare parts for some of their older Russian made warplanes. In addition, Iran expects Russia to be more helpful in Syria, where Russia already has an understanding with Israel that involves Russia not interfering with Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets. In return Israel does not supply Ukraine with weapons. Most Israelis support the Ukrainians but they also recognize the threat from Iranians in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza. Russia and Iran are still negotiating terms for this issue.

The Assads, a long-time client of oil-rich Iran, managed to keep the Syrian economy going after a Syrian civil war began in 2012. Aid from Iran and Russia was substantial until recently, and there was a measure of security and prosperity in areas where the Assads regained control. No more. Without Russian and Iranian aid, the security and prosperity campaigns are on hold. Russian and Iranian aid has declined sharply since 2014, when Iran supplied needed foreign currency and Russia helped the Assad government reconnect with the international banking system. Aid from Russia and Iran had kept the Assad government and the Syrian Air Force going. The loss of Russian and Iranian support over the last few years was catastrophic because no one else stepped up to replace that aid. Oil-rich Arab states are a potential source of cash for rebuilding the economy. Syria is rejoining the Arab League and negotiating the nature and scope of Arab investments in Syria during the rebuilding effort. Arab states want Syria to be strong enough to eliminate the thousands of Islamic terrorists still active in northwestern and eastern Syria. The Turks are helping in the northwest, mainly because they want the Syrian side of the border pacified enough to send back hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees who have been living in Turkey.

There are some American troops, and air support, in eastern Syria to help fight the Islamic terrorists there. Israel is also involved, using missile-armed UAVs to attack terrorist targets and Iranian efforts to move more weapons into Syria. Iraq also hosts several thousand American troops. These are part of an effort to reduce growing Iranian influence in Iraq. Arabs see Iran as a major troublemaker in the region. The Turks, Americans and Israelis agree and are all doing something to keep the Iranians out. The Assads are somewhere in the middle when it comes to Iran.

June 5, 2023: British media have published details of Iranian sales documents describing sales of over a million dollars’ worth of ammunition and spare parts for weapons to Russia. Iran denies this even though details of how the ammo and parts got to Russia were known.

June 4, 2023: At the entrance to the Persian Gulf (Strait of Hormuz) three IRGC gunboats approached a cargo ship. Fearing the Iranians would attempt to hijack the, the captain of the civilian vessel issued a distress call and two destroyers (one American, one British) responded and the Iranian gunboats left the scene. Earlier this year (May and April) Iranians seized two oil tankers.

June 2, 2023: In the northwest the IRGC used UAVs carrying explosives to attack Iranian Kurdish separatists based in northern Iraq.

June 1, 2023: Iran-backed militias in Syria continue firing rockets at American troops in Syria. Sometimes Iran-backed groups in Iraq attack American troops in Iraq. The Americans retaliate and Iran denies any responsibility for the violence.

May 31, 2023: Iranian anti-government hackers group Rise to Overthrow gained access to a government computer network used by senior Iranian officials and made off with documents describing the efforts to build nuclear weapons and new security measures at the Fordow nuclear facility. Earlier this year the IAEA reported that while inspecting Iranian facilities they found traces of uranium enriched to 83.7 percent, just short of the 90 percent required for nuclear weapons. These samples were found at the Fordow processing facility where uranium is only supposed to be enriched to 60 percent.

May 27, 2023: Egypt and Israel continue having problems with Iran encouraging violence in Gaza by sending cash and weapons to pro-Iran Islamic terrorist groups. Currently Iran is encouraging Hamas to boast of its preparations for another war with Israel. Hamas believes that if they can inflict enough damage on Israel by killing or capturing soldiers and civilians they can prompt Moslem and Western countries to pressure Israel to allow more access to Gaza and send more aid. Hamas also hopes that Israel bombs and ground forces do enough damage inside Gaza to allow Hamas to get away with portraying itself as a victim and again persuading other nations to help. This will be difficult because the Arab donors no longer trust Hamas (or Fatah either) and are put off by the recent Iranian announcement that it was still subsidizing Hamas, which has run Gaza and its 1.5 million Palestinians since 2005. Iran supported Hamas early on. There were recently more rumors that Iran had stopped supporting Hamas. Iran had decreased its support, in large part because of Western sanctions for Iranian support of terrorism and lower oil prices, but never cut off Hamas completely. Although Sunni Hamas sometimes persecutes Shia, Iran supports energetic Hamas efforts to attack Israel. Hamas also supports Islamic terrorists active in Egypt, which turned Egypt completely against Hamas and helped put Egypt firmly into the anti-Iran Sunni coalition. The Iran link makes Hamas an enemy as far as most Sunni Moslem nations are concerned. Hamas has made a lot of bad decisions since 2005 and the Iran link is seen as one of the worst. In response to Arab states who have cut aid to Gaza and the West Bank, Palestinian leaders have quietly told the reluctant Arab donors that if they do not increase aid there will be violent Palestinian protests (in Gaza, West Bank and Jerusalem) against the Arab donors as well as Israel. These Arab donors (mainly Gulf oil states like Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait) have lost patience with the Palestinians and not only cut donor aid, which was being stolen or misused by corrupt Palestinian leaders, but also openly allied themselves with Israel against Iran. The Arab world still technically backs the Palestinians and their effort to destroy Israel but has lost confidence in the Palestinians.

By providing sanctuary to Islamic terror groups that operate in Egypt, Hamas has made an enemy of Egypt. Thus, since 2012, Egypt has limited the ability of Gaza residents to enter or leave Gaza via Egypt. Worse, the Egyptians have gone after the smuggling tunnels. The most successful tactic has been filling the smuggling tunnels with water. This began in 2013 when the Egyptians dug small canals for seawater that could then be pumped into tunnels discovered. It was eventually found that flooding permanently destroyed the tunnel better than any other method because it caused the sandy soil in the area to collapse and remain unstable. It is believed that only about twenty tunnels are still operating and every week several of those are discovered and flooded. The army engineers have learned that you have to not only flood the tunnels but keep flooding them because the Palestinians can obtain pumps to remove the water and repair the damage. But if you keep the tunnel flooded long enough it collapses and has to be rebuilt as if there were never a tunnel there in the first place. Egypt has also created a buffer zone along the border by moving Egyptians out and destroying all buildings. This means tunnels from Gaza now have to be over a kilometer long and deeper as well to evade detection. To make matters worse Egyptian police watch buildings within a few kilometers of the Gaza border for signs of a tunnel entrance. The police are less likely to take bribes from smuggling tunnel operators because Gaza-based Islamic terrorists have killed a lot of Egyptian police and soldiers in the last few years.

May 26, 2023: The U.S. Navy wants its Persian Gulf allies to cooperate in using more USVs (Unmanned Surface Vehicles) to increase security in the Gulf, especially the entrance (the Strait of Hormuz). There is certainly a need for more security because Iran recently used commandos landed by helicopter to seize two oil tankers and hold them hostage off the Iranian coast. The larcenous Iranians have also been known to hijack USVs. To better monitor Iranian mischief, the Americans have already deployed fifty USVs in the Gulf and want its Gulf allies to add more of their own. The American USVs are unarmed models like the DriX and Saildrone. Both have long endurance and lots of sensors. With all that in mind it seems like a good idea to use more USVs in the Gulf. Not all the Gulf Arabs are eager to do this and would rather invest in more manned warships. Iranians consider such warships targets for their attacks. The Americans point out that the USVs operate 24/7 and in all sorts of bad weather. They transmit video and radar data back to a land or sea based control center, providing wide coverage of who is doing what throughout the Gulf. The Iranians consider this harassment while the Arabs and their Western allies consider that reaction a sign that all those USVs are getting the job done.

May 25, 2023: Iran conducted a test launch of the updated version of its Khorramshahr ballistic missile. With a range of 2,000 kilometers, it carries a 1.5 ton warhead. The new version now uses storable liquid fuel, which reduces launch preparation time to about 12 minutes. The existence of Khorramshahr was revealed in a 2017 parade. The new missile was test fired in 2017. That test failed but another in 2020 succeeded. Khorramshahr is remarkably similar to the earlier North Korean Hwasong-12. Iran and North Korea have long been secret trading partners. Both nations are heavily sanctioned. Iran has oil that North Korea needs and North Korea has ballistic missile technology that Iran seeks. Iran does not yet have nuclear weapons, so Khorramshahr can only carry a high-explosive or chemical weapon warhead. Iran wants to destroy Israel and ballistic missiles that can carry multiple nuclear warheads and reach Israel. The problem is that Israel has had ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) systems for over a decade that are designed to intercept long-range missiles. Israel already has nuclear weapons and deliver them via ballistic missile, submarine-launched or aircraft-launched cruise missiles. Most Iranians know this and that is another reason their current religious dictatorship is so unpopular.

May 24, 2023: In the west (Ilam Province) a 21 year-old student who was injured during a recent anti-government protest died while in the hospital. The government said the student committed suicide while his family insisted he died of his injuries and the medical staff at the hospital confirmed that. Another twenty protesters were also injured by the violent effort to disperse the protest. These protests began nine-months ago to protest a young woman being killed by the lifestyle police who arrested her for not hearing her hijab head covering properly. The “hijab protests” continue despite the government's use of violence against protesters. Iranians are angry about continued economic problems and increased economic sanctions imposed on Iran because of its support for Russia in the Ukraine War and continued heavy spending to support Iranian violence in Syria.

May 17, 2023: Somalia expelled two EU (European Union) aid officials for taking photos of a Somali prison. This is a problem because Somalia treats its prison inmates more harshly than is the case back in Europe. None of the 36 prisoners involved were Somali and most were Iranian. All had been caught fishing illegally in Somali waters and were imprisoned until the nations they were from could agree on suitable restitution.

May 15, 2023: Iran has become a major source of military equipment, weapons and munitions for Russia. For example, Russian reserves of 152mm artillery munitions are exhausted and production facilities in Russia are unable to supply additional shells quickly enough to refill the depleted war reserve. Russia received 300,000 shells from Iran and a similar amount from North Korea. South Korea maintains a large stockpile of 155mm shells and that has persuaded North Korea to limit the number of shells they send Russia. NATO nations have provided Ukraine with over a million 155mm shells and a smaller quantity of 152mm shells. NATO nations have more production capabilities for artillery shells but not enough to keep the Ukrainians supplied with what they need. This means that both Ukrainian and Russian forces have less artillery ammunition than they need. This favors the Ukrainians, who's attacking forces will face less artillery fire while they are advancing and out in the open.

May 14, 2023: The U.S. has concluded that a March UAV attack on an American base in Syria, which killed a military contractor, was launched by an Iran-backed militia in nearby Iraq.

May 10, 2023: Iran supports Lebanon’s efforts to expel Sunni Arab refugees who have flooded in because of the fighting in Syria. Lebanon has started registering and attempting to deport Syrian refugees. The nearly two million Sunni Arab Syrian refugees that fled to Lebanon since 2012, radically changing the demography of Lebanon. Before 2011 the Lebanese population was only five million. Since nearly all those refugees are Sunni Moslems, it radically changes the religious mix of Lebanon from 27 percent Shia, 27 percent Sunni, and 46 percent Christian (and other religions) to a more volatile combination. With the refugee influx there were now seven million people in Lebanon and 47 percent were Sunni, 19 percent Shia and 34 percent Christian (and others). This put the Hezbollah militia in a bad situation. Their better armed and trained fighters have been able to dominate the other minorities since the 1980s. That was possible because of Iranian cash, weapons and advisors. But the Iranian help and better organization is no longer enough when the Sunnis are nearly half the population and out for blood because of the slaughter the Iran backed Shia Syrian government inflicted on Syrian Sunnis. Lebanon does not want another civil war over this and it was becoming difficult to contain the anger. Hezbollah and Iran have had some success attracting non-Shia factions (especially Christians) to be part of the Shia coalition. This is traditional Lebanese politics, with the Christians surviving by forming a coalition with non-Christian groups. Now even these Christian factions are backing away from Hezbollah. By 2023 Lebanon felt itself capable of dealing with the refugee crisis, especially since large-scale violence in Syria has largely disappeared. There are 5.5 million refugees in neighboring countries. Turkey has 3.6 million, Lebanon two million and 250,000 in Iraq. There are also several million Syrians in Saudi Arabia, who are considered part of the large (over six million foreigners) expatriate workforce. About a third of those workers are Syrians. While many fled to Saudi Arabia because of the war in Syria, they were not treated like refugees and have jobs and status in Saudi Arabia. Countries bordering Syria want their refugees to go home. That cannot happen without the cooperation of the Assads. Syria needs a lot of those refugees to revive the economy and the Arab League is willing to allow Syria to rejoin if they reduce their cooperation with Iran. That has always been a dangerous option for the Assads because the Iranians have enough armed operatives inside Syria to threaten the lives of key Assad clan members. Currently, Iranian power is unusually weak inside Iran and inside Syria. Now is a good time for the Assads to make a break from Iran, especially if he has the support of the Arab League and assurances that the League will help, not hinder Assad use of force to maintain their rule in Syria. Turkey does not belong to the Arab League but is eager to send its Syrian refugee’s home. The Assad offer is acceptable if it will finally get those Syrians out of Turkey. The Assad’s appear to have decided in favor of the Arab League. That outcome of that decision will become known and put into effect sometime this year.

May 8, 2023: Israel began a major effort to kill leaders of Iran-backed PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad), which is based in Gaza and responsible for the growing number of rocket attacks on southern Israel as well as more ambitious operations in the West Bank to kill or kidnap Israelis. Hamas had a major presence in Gaza when they formed JOR (Joint Operations Room). This was a coalition of twelve Palestinian factions seeking, and sometimes succeeding in attacking Israel or individual Israelis. Hamas supervises JOR and supplies rockets and other weapons from Iran. Israel has armed patrol boats operating along the Gaza coast and regularly intercepting Iranian arms shipments trying to land weapons from fishing boats. These shipments have an even more difficult time getting across the Gaza border with Egypt. The Egyptians are often the victims of Iranian weapons and guard their border with Gaza. Israel and Egypt exchange information on Iranian arms shipments and often cooperate in capturing the smugglers trying to get in via Sinai or Iranian smuggling tunnels. Israel had found and killed at least six leaders of the JOR and that encouraged Iran to increase its weapons smuggling efforts.

May 6, 2023: In southern Syria (Daraa province) on the Israeli border, there has been a lot of random violence so far in 2013, with over 200 separate incidents of violence that have caused over 500 casualties. The violence is mainly against Syrian army personnel. This level of violence remained fairly constant since 2018. This is part of the undeclared war between Iranian and Syrian forces going on there since 2018. Anonymous assassins use pistols and hidden bombs to kill those who work, or worked for government forces or Russia and Syria backed local militias. There are also attacks against former members of ISIL and other militant groups. These victims had accepted amnesty. Russian and Assad forces openly force Iran-backed groups and individuals out of the area. There is no open violence because Iran, Syria and Russia are still officially allies. Israel sometimes fires on Iranian forces operating in Daraa, especially near the Israeli border. Israel also shares intel with Russia and Syria about Syrian officers who are secretly working for Iran. The Iranians pay well, and in dollars. Israel will sometimes release evidence of this to the media, so that Iranians back home have another reason to oppose Iranian foreign wars. Negotiations have been underway between Iran and Russia/Syria since 2020 but have not made much progress. The covert Iranian violence is just another incentive for Syria to get the Iranian agents out of the area. In 2022 and 2023 much of the violence is from other groups, some of them criminal gangs retaliating against those who refuse to pay for protection from the violence. Daraa is the most violent province but similar violence continues in many parts of Syria.

May 4, 2023: Visiting Syria for two days, Ebrahim Raisi, the Iranian president, met with key members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. These two terror groups are based in Gaza and depend on Iran for financial support and weapons. Raisi discussed planned terror attacks in southern Israel, the West Bank, Jerusalem and now from Lebanon. Iran forced Hamas to establish a partnership with Hezbollah to recruit Palestinians living in Lebanon to carry out rocket attacks into Israel. The Lebanese are not happy with this because Hamas could get too aggressive and trigger a major Israeli response against Hamas and the larger Hezbollah in southern Lebanon as well as terrorist targets throughout Lebanon. Iran is using a complex and dangerous strategy with all these terrorist groups. For one thing, these groups are divided by religion. Hezbollah and Iran are Shia while Palestinians are Sunni or Christian. Then there is the ethnicity problem. All the Arabs are Semitic while the Iranians are Indo-European and have a history of treating Arabs poorly. Most Lebanese want Iranian and Palestinian radicalism gone from Lebanon, or at least kept quiet. Firing rockets into Israel is dangerous for all Lebanese. Iran is playing a dangerous and explosive game here, one that could backfire on Iran. Most Iranians oppose these expensive sponsorships of Arab terror groups that cost a lot, make a lot of noise and don’t seem to be hurting the Israelis. The popular anger against the government in Iran grows and Raisi has to keep that in mind while working with all these Arab terror groups and their demands for more money. Raisi also met with the Syrian president Bashar Assad to discuss continued cooperation between Syria and Iran as well as problems with Israeli, Islamic terrorist and Turkish operations in Syria, especially the ones aimed at Iranians in Syria. Then there is the Syrian effort to get back in the Arab League and accept large amounts of Arab aid and investment to rebuild Syria’s shattered economy. Iran does not get along with many members of the Arab League while Syria wants to get cozy with the League. In late 2011 Syria was suspended from the Arab League and many of the 21 other League members cut diplomatic relations or imposed sanctions. The Arab League was unable to do much more. By early 2013 the Arab League was still unable to muster enough unity to call for international (Western) intervention in Syria. The Arab League did that in 2011 for Libya and many Arabs considered it shameful that the Arab world could not handle the military intervention itself. Despite trillions of dollars in oil income and hundreds of millions of Arabs demanding something be done, the Arab League had to call on outsiders to save Libya from degenerating into an interminable bloodbath. That is what happened in Syria and many Arabs refused to accept responsibility and just blamed the West and Israel for the mess. Given that toxic atmosphere, Western nations, including NATO member Turkey, were reluctant to do what the Arabs wanted done but would not admit they cannot do it themselves. Iran and the Russians intervened in support of the Assads and the slaughter of pro-rebel civilians continued as did Assad efforts to force pro-rebel civilians out of Syria.

May 3, 2023: Russian air strikes against Ukrainian cities using Iranian Shahed-136s resulted in one of the UAVs having engine trouble and landing intact. This enabled Ukrainian and foreign investigators to scrutinize the construction of the Shahed-136. Most of these that run into engine problems crash and explode. This one had been given contaminated fuel that caused the UAV to gradually descend and hit the ground without enough impact to set off the warhead contact fuze.

Obtaining an intact aircraft allowed for a more thorough inspection to be done. The MD-550 engine was built in Iran and it was confirmed that this was indeed an illegal copy of the German L-550 engine. Iran had obtained one of these engines in 2006 and used it in several UAVs, including Shahed-136. The L-550 entered production in the 1980s and was a popular engine for ultralight aircraft and UAVs. Legal copies of the L-550 cost about $15,000 each. That means a Shahed-136 costs about twice the original estimate of $20,000 each. A Shahed-136 weighs 200 kg (440 pounds) and is armed with a warhead containing 30 to 50 kg, most of it explosives. That’s not a lot because most cruise missiles carry warheads weighing half a ton (500 kg) or more. The Shahed-136 warhead will damage, not destroy, most structures it hits. Shahed-136 is launched using a rocket motor that gets it into the air and then detaches and falls away.

May 2, 2023: The media watchdog “Reporters Without Borders” (RSF) has placed Iran near the bottom of its World Press Freedom Index for the fifth year in a row. North Korea ranks last, at 180th place, followed by China (179th), Vietnam (178th), Iran (177th) and Turkmenistan (176th).

June 7, 2023: Iran openly opposes any peace with the West because of Western insistence that Iran first cease its support for violence in Iraq and Syria as well its nuclear-weapons program. Iranian forces in Iraq seek to dominate the Iraqi government and its forces in Syria continue to try to establish bases for attacking Israel, while Iran officially insists it has no nuclear weapons program despite growing evidence that the nuclear weapons efforts continue. Iran is open about its plans to eventually destroy Israel with ballistic missiles carrying “powerful” warheads. Israel says it will carry out airstrikes against Iranian nuclear weapons facilities if it appears Iran is close to having such weapons. There is ample evidence that the nuclear program exists and much of the work is done at the Natanz underground facility 225 kilometers south of Tehran. Israel has successfully attacked Natanz several times in the last few years. Iran responds by repairing the damage and expanding the nuclear facilities deeper underground. In early 2021 there was an explosion at the Natanz nuclear fuel enrichment facility. The government first denied this but later admitted the attack took place and did major damage to their new high-performance nuclear enrichment (turning uranium into weapons grade material) equipment. There was massive equipment failure and damage on a scale similar to the 2010 attack carried out with software designed to get into the Natanz nuclear fuel enrichment compound, which was well guarded. Later analysis indicated that the deep-underground (about 50 meters, or 155 feet) plant was effectively destroyed. The target was the thousands of centrifuges that turn uranium ore into nuclear fuel or, with more effort, nuclear material suitable for a nuclear explosive. Israeli hackers got to the centrifuges in 2010 via a computer worm hack called Stuxnet.

In 2021 the Israelis obtained technical details of the Natanz electrical system as well as details of the new generation of centrifuges Iran installed there. The Israeli plan was to use explosives placed and detonated where it would shut down the primary and back-up power systems when the maximum number of new centrifuges were powered up and vulnerable to severe damage if both the main power and backup power systems failed. The explosives were placed correctly and went off on time. The result was Natanz again suffered major centrifuge loss that delayed resumption of production and over a year to completely repair. Now the Americans have developed a 14 ton MOP (Massive Ordnance Penetrator) bomb designed to destroy or disable such underground facilities. MOP has a guidance system so that it lands where it will do the most damage, MOP also has a void sensor that will detonate the bomb when it enters an underground facility after smashing through earth and concrete. For this reason, Iran has expanded the Natanz facility deeper underground. That does not prevent Natanz from being attacked by several MOPs that destroy the four access tunnels needed to enable personnel and material to get in and out of the underground facility.

Iranian support for Russia in Ukraine, especially supplying Russia with weapons, has made it easier for Israel to justify attacks on Iran, including air strikes. Iran has now claimed to have developed Fattah, a hypersonic missile with a range of 1,400 kilometers and the ability to evade Israeli defenses against long range missiles. Iran frequently makes claims like this about new weapons that are more aspirational than actual. Russia has hypersonic missiles and used them in Ukraine. Russians were surprised when Ukraine found a way to use their new American Patriot systems to shoot down hypersonic missiles. Iran insists that Fattah performs more effectively than Russian hypersonic missiles. An Israeli airstrike would be wide-ranging and include a wide variety of targets, including factories that produce ballistic and hypersonic missile components.

Inaction On Poverty

Many Iranian leaders believe that an uprising is possible if the religious dictatorship does nothing or tries to suppress the continuing protests against poverty and violent suppression of protests. That kind of suppression is increasingly less effective and members of the religious establishment and some IRGC leaders openly express concern that a more serious uprising is possible and whoever wins, Iran loses. So far, a majority of the senior clerics in the Guardians Council oppose any concessions to those demanding economic reforms and an end of lifestyle rules. IRGC leaders are less eager to oppose any concessions. Many IRGC leaders are closer to the protests and have a better sense of how angry Iranians are and how far most Iranians are willing to go. The IRGC is not large enough to take on most Iranians and many individual IRGC men are not willing to slaughter a lot of fellow Iranians to keep corrupt religious and IRGC leaders in power. The continued economic sanctions make life difficult for more Iranians who are unemployed and cannot afford the higher food prices.

Supporting Smuggling

Iran has growing problems with international efforts to disrupt Iranian smuggling efforts. For example, in 2018, the multi-national ECC (Enforcement Coordination Cell) was created. Initial members were the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Britain, France, South Korea, and Japan. The ECC is enforcing the UN sanctions approved at the end of 2017 to curb North Korean smuggling related to items needed for their nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In addition, the ECC allowed member nations to also enforce whatever other sanctions or naval missions their government put a priority on. The U.S. has since invited India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines to join and assist with monitoring growing Chinese violation of offshore water rights, especially in the South China Sea and other areas of the West Pacific.

The ECC concentrates on the 2,000-kilometer-long shipping lane from the Indian ocean, through the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea to North Korea. Along this route there are not only North Korean flagged ships participating in smuggling, but even more Chinese, Taiwanese, Liberian, Sri Lankan, and ships that are independent and fly whatever flag they believe will keep them from getting seized for smuggling. Earlier U.S. efforts had already identified many North Korean and Iranian owned tankers and cargo ships that were often engaged in smuggling. This led Iran and North Korea to use their own ships less and willing foreign ships instead. These third-party ships are the ones the ECC sought to identify. These ships can be identified, along with their owners and the owners can have banking and other sanctions placed on them. Many nations not part of the ECC, but economic partners with ECC members will cooperate if a smuggler ship visits one of their ports. At that point the captain can be arrested and the ship impounded.

The ECC is based on the success of Task Force 150, which came to involve twenty nations contributing ships and aircraft to deal with the Somali piracy problem. By 2012 the problem was under control but the threat and a smaller Task Force remains. As the Somali piracy problem was fading under Task Force 150 pressure, the U.S. organized another ECC to monitor and disrupt North Korea and Iran smuggling operations. This was done with the aid of the “Five Eyes”, a post-World War II intel cooperation group consisting of the U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Five Eyes intel agencies shared an unprecedented amount of intelligence on foreign threats during the Cold War and continued doing so after the Cold War ended in 1991. As international Islamic terrorism began to increase during the 1990s and especially after 2001, the Five Eyes continued to provide the member nations with much more useful intel than any of them could gather themselves. This became particularly useful as Chinese aggression in the South China Sea and adjacent seas escalated after 2012, as the size of the Chinese navy and threats it posed to most of the Five Eyes members as well as other allies like Japan and South Korea. This encouraged many nations to join or consider joining the new ECC as well as earlier counter-terrorism efforts.

Sanctions against Iranian oil exports mean that smuggled shipments not only must be sold at a discount, but that some will be seized by nations belonging to the ECC. In addition, there is less demand for oil because of a changing market. While Iran had reduced production to deal with this, they cannot reduce production enough without shutting down some wells. This costs money, as does restoring these wells to use. Iran produces more than it can sell and at one point was stuck with a stockpile of 50 million barrels of unsold oil. That stockpile has been reduced recently to about 19 million barrels. The unsold oil is usually stored in tanker ships, ready to be moved (smuggled) on short notice.

Iraq

In addition to many American contractors, Iraq also hosts several thousand American troops. These are part of an effort to reduce growing Iranian influence in Iraq. Arabs see Iran as a major troublemaker in the region. The Turks, Americans and Israelis agree and are all doing something to keep the Iranians out. The Assads in neighboring Syria are somewhere in the middle when it comes to Iran. At the moment the Assads want closer relations with its fellow Arabs, have been able to gain re-admittance to the Arab League and are negotiating with Saudi Arabia for reconstruction assistance and commercial investments.

Keeping Iran out of Iraq is complicated by the fact that lots of Iraqis have been pro-Iranian for almost twenty years, and a growing number appear to be on the government payroll via the post-2014 deal that put all PMF (Popular Mobilization Force) militias on the army payroll. Technically this meant that the PMF units had to report to senior army commanders and obey orders issued by army generals. The PMF units took the payroll cash but refused to obey army commands or requests. Each year the PMF units demanded more money from the government. This cash was deducted from the army budget. This year PMF wants nearly $3 billion. The PMF claims that this is what it needed to support about 200,000 PMF members and that number increases each year. The PMF leadership additionally contends that many of its troops will resort to violence if not paid. The PMF is composed of many groups with different and/or conflicting motives (some are even patriotic and lots more are pro-Iranian), but most are corruption scams (“ghost soldiers”). This is when large numbers of soldiers are claimed but do not exist and whoever controls the payroll and other expenses for these non-existent troops just steals the money. It is suspected that some of the ghost soldier cash going to the PMF is being diverted to Iran. This would not be the first time that cash from Iraqi corruption went to Iran, which is responsible for a lot of the corruption in Iraq.

Yemen

Iranian influence on the Shia rebels is fading and many rebel factions call for some kind of peace deal and an end to a civil war that the rebels were losing. The war continues in part because this factionalism among the rebels is something that the government and Saudis are unable to address.

Ceasefire negotiations did have some positive results, in addition to the reduced fighting plus halts to Saudi airstrikes and rebel missile attacks into Saudi Arabia. Commercial passenger and cargo flights were resumed in rebel-controlled airports. In February aid shipments resumed through the Red Sea port of Hodeida for the first time since 2016 with the arrival of the first general cargo ship which unloaded followed by the arrival and unloading of two more. The cargo delivery was made possible by the ongoing peace talks between the government and the Shia rebels. Bringing general cargo in via Hodeida was cheaper for customers in the northwest than the previous use of the southern port of Aden. This required sending the cargo north by truck.

There is still some fighting in the usual war zones; Taiz province in the south and Marib in central Yemen. The fighting is less intense than in the past. The Saudis continue to negotiate directly with the Shia rebels in order to keep the peace on the Saudi border. The peace in the Shia rebel north is partly the result of exhaustion after eight years of fighting and not much to show for it. Down south the Yemen government controls 80 percent of Yemen but has to deal with separatist southerners and Islamic terrorists. The STC (South Transitional Council) and many government troops spent the ceasefire period going after Islamic terrorist groups AQAP (Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) and ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) in the south and east. A major reason for rebels agreeing to a ceasefire was a decline in Iranian support due to lack of funds plus unrest at home. The Iranian weapons, cash, advisors and smuggling network supercharged the Shia rebels, enabling them to keep fighting the more numerous and better armed force arrayed against them. Iran has been openly supporting the Shia rebels since 2014 and later admitted that less visible support had been supplied since 2011.

Eight years of civil war have revived the centuries old north-south divide. This was last “mended” in the 1990s. The possibility of a split has returned because the UAE (United Arab Emirates) has been in charge of security (and aid delivery) in the south since 2015 and supported formation of the STC. This group is composed of southern tribes that want autonomy but are willing to fight and defeat the Islamic terrorists as well as the Shia rebels first. Aidarous al Zubaidi, the STC leader, is seen as more popular in the south than any government official. The Saudis and the UAE do not agree on dividing Yemen once more but for the moment it is more convenient to support the STC and efforts to defeat the Iran-backed Shia rebels.

Information based on interceptions by American and other warships in the naval blockade of rebel-controlled coastlines indicates that Iranian smuggling of weapons to the rebels continues but at a lower intensity, and consists mainly of infantry weapons rather than cruise and ballistic missiles used to attack Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are negotiating directly with the Iranians about the fighting in Yemen and how to reduce it. This is part of an effort, brokered by the Chinese, to improve relations between the Saudis and Iran and reduce the tensions in the Persian Gulf and Yemen.

Yemen was in bad shape economically before the civil war began in 2015. Since then the situation has gotten much worse. There have been nearly 400,000 deaths, most of them caused by starvation and illness, not combat. The damage to infrastructure and lack of food led to an outbreak of cholera in 2016, which has made over two million people ill since then, killing about 4,000. Nearly fifteen percent of the population were driven from their homes. Nearly 20 million of the 24 million Yemenis have suffered hunger and/or poverty as a result of the war. Most Yemenis are exhausted by the years of privation and violence and are willing to accept peace on just about any terms.

Afghanistan

There is some international cooperation with the IEA (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) in areas of mutual interest. The most obvious one is Islamic terrorism, which is also a problem for the IEA. The primary Islamic terror threat in Afghanistan is from ISK (Islamic State Khorasan), which was formed in Afghanistan during 2015, with the help of ISIL leadership in Syria, to handle ISIL activity throughout the region (Central Asia, Iran, Pakistan and India). ISK found they were most effective if they confined their operations to Afghanistan and Pakistan, which they have been doing since 2019.

The IEA also has problems because they cannot gain any official recognition that they are the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Most nations consider the IEA a Pakistan-backed Islamic terror group that took control of the government with the additional help of Afghan drug cartels. ISK has become more active in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the IEA took over because now no one is in charge and that is ideal for ISK and the drug cartels. ISK and the cartels stay out of each other’s way because neither has anything to gain, and much to lose, by attacking each other. The cartels pay IEA to refrain from attacking drug operations, which include poppy crops and small labs that convert portions of the poppies into opium and then heroin. ISK sees no point carrying out terror attacks against the cartels because the cartels will do the same to ISK and on a larger scale. In that respect the cartels are terrorists, but only when cash does not suffice. ISK is different because they see IEA as heretics and enemies of Islam. IEA feels the same way towards ISK. Other Moslems in Afghanistan and neighboring nations regard ISK as religious zealots who defame Islam. The only relatively safe base for ISK is IEA ruled Afghanistan. Despite that, ISK attacks targets in Afghanistan, including IEA but not the drug cartels. ISK also uses its Afghan bases on the Pakistan border to carry out attacks in Pakistan. There used to be some ISK actions across the Iranian border but attacks on Iran were more costly, in terms of cash and personnel, then similar efforts against IEA and Pakistani targets. ISK also plans attacks farther away, especially in Western countries. These attacks are more risky and prone to trigger massive counterattacks. Western nations, especially the United States, continue to observe ISK operations and carry out occasional airstrikes, usually with missile armed UAVs.

The IEA has a border dispute involving access to scarce water. Drought conditions have been a problem in both countries for several years. This is in addition to Iranian complaints about the Afghan heroin smuggled into Iran to support several million addicts.

Syria

A month ago (May 4th) Syria was visited by the president of Iran reaffirming support for the Assad government. Without the $30 billion Iran spent since 2011 to keep the Assads in power, the Assads would have lost. Currently the Assad government is technically in control of 90 percent of Syria but that control is weaker than it was before 2011. There are not enough trained police and soldiers to maintain order throughout Syria, so many areas are still generally lawless and dominated by Islamic terrorists, outlaw militias and gangsters of all sorts. To survive, the Assads have to maintain relationships with the Iranians, Sunni Arabs, Turkey, Russia, Israel and the Americans.

The fighting in Syria is sharply down from the high experienced in 2014-15. Nearly 6,000 died in October 2014. About 17 percent of those dead were civilians, 15 percent from government forces and the rest from various rebel groups. ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) is believed to have suffered over 2,000 dead in October 2014, mainly because they were fighting everyone else simultaneously. The highest annual death toll was in 2014, when at least 100,000 died. Annual deaths declined after that, reaching about 3,800 in 2021 and the decline has continued to the present. This year the death toll is much lower and will probably be a few thousand for all of 2023. This includes Islamic terrorists, Syrian security forces and civilians. Last month (April) was an exceptionally bloody month with 407 deaths. That’s the highest in 14 months.

Since the civil war began in 2011 the death toll is estimated to be between 400,000 and 500,000. Iran wanted the civil war to end so they could concentrate on Israel. The key role of Iran in Syria has been noted and no one, not even Iranian allies, are cooperating with Iran. The only ones who cannot walk away from this are the Assads, Turkey and Israel.

Syrians in general and particularly the Assads are aware of the damage done to Syria by a decade of war. The best evidence of the performance of the Syrian economy is the strength of the Syrian currency. The exchange rate was 50 pounds to the dollar before the violence began in 2011. In late 2022 it was 5,000 pounds to the dollar and currently it is 7,000 pounds to the dollar. The average monthly income is under $200 a month and much of that comes from expatriates sending remittances. The loss of oil shipments from Iran is a major factor in the collapse of the economy. The change in exchange rates also reflects the failure of the Assads to make much progress in the last few years. Aid from Russia and Iran had kept the Assad government and the Syrian Air Force going. The loss of Russian and Iranian support over the last few years was catastrophic because no one else stepped up to replace that aid.

The damage is worse than most outsiders can appreciate when you take into account expected (normal) growth in the economy (GDP) and the population if the war had not happened. This data assumes a decade of some post-war reconstruction for the real Syria. In contrast, Syria without the war would have a population of 32 million by 2030. Because so many (over six million) Syrians fled the country and fewer were born (and more died) the most likely population of war-ravaged Syria by 2030 is 22 million. Most of the refugees (Sunni Arabs) do not want to return to a homeland dominated by a Shia government and occupied by Iranian (and Shia) forces. In these “war/no-war” comparisons, the economic projections show the country even worse off. Currently GDP is less than a third of what it was in 2011. But even with a decade of post-war reconstruction 2030 GDP would only be about 74 percent of what it was in 2011 and about 35 percent of what it would have been in 2030 without a war. Without the war GDP would have doubled by 2030. It is possible that Syria will grow (in terms of GDP and population) at a faster rate but that is unlikely since not a lot of nations are lining up to donate to or invest in reconstruction. In part that is due to the expected long-term presence of Iran or, even without that, the Assads would probably remain in power and still be accused of war crimes during the war. There is no statute of limitations on that sort of thing. Meanwhile the years of war have destroyed structures, infrastructure and businesses that would cost several hundred billion dollars to replace. That will be hard to do for a nation that had a 2011 GDP of about $60 billion and not a lot of natural resources other than its people and their many skills.

China recently brokered a peace deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This had nothing to do with Syria and was meant to ensure the flow of Persian Gulf oil to China. Iran was willing to behave so that it could concentrate on supporting the Russian war effort in Ukraine. Russia invaded Ukraine 14 months ago and lost what they believed would be a quick victory. Iran turned out to be one of the few nations willing and able to supply the Russians with weapons. Russia paid for this with weapons technology, including some modern Su-35 jet fighters and spare parts for some of their older Russian made warplanes. In addition, Iran expects Russia to be more helpful in Syria, where Russia already has an understanding with Israel that involves Russia not interfering with Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets. In return Israel does not supply Ukraine with weapons. Most Israelis support the Ukrainians but they also recognize the threat from Iranians in Syria, Lebanon and Gaza. Russia and Iran are still negotiating terms for this issue.

The Assads, a long-time client of oil-rich Iran, managed to keep the Syrian economy going after a Syrian civil war began in 2012. Aid from Iran and Russia was substantial until recently, and there was a measure of security and prosperity in areas where the Assads regained control. No more. Without Russian and Iranian aid, the security and prosperity campaigns are on hold. Russian and Iranian aid has declined sharply since 2014, when Iran supplied needed foreign currency and Russia helped the Assad government reconnect with the international banking system. Aid from Russia and Iran had kept the Assad government and the Syrian Air Force going. The loss of Russian and Iranian support over the last few years was catastrophic because no one else stepped up to replace that aid. Oil-rich Arab states are a potential source of cash for rebuilding the economy. Syria is rejoining the Arab League and negotiating the nature and scope of Arab investments in Syria during the rebuilding effort. Arab states want Syria to be strong enough to eliminate the thousands of Islamic terrorists still active in northwestern and eastern Syria. The Turks are helping in the northwest, mainly because they want the Syrian side of the border pacified enough to send back hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees who have been living in Turkey.

There are some American troops, and air support, in eastern Syria to help fight the Islamic terrorists there. Israel is also involved, using missile-armed UAVs to attack terrorist targets and Iranian efforts to move more weapons into Syria. Iraq also hosts several thousand American troops. These are part of an effort to reduce growing Iranian influence in Iraq. Arabs see Iran as a major troublemaker in the region. The Turks, Americans and Israelis agree and are all doing something to keep the Iranians out. The Assads are somewhere in the middle when it comes to Iran.

June 5, 2023: British media have published details of Iranian sales documents describing sales of over a million dollars’ worth of ammunition and spare parts for weapons to Russia. Iran denies this even though details of how the ammo and parts got to Russia were known.

June 4, 2023: At the entrance to the Persian Gulf (Strait of Hormuz) three IRGC gunboats approached a cargo ship. Fearing the Iranians would attempt to hijack the, the captain of the civilian vessel issued a distress call and two destroyers (one American, one British) responded and the Iranian gunboats left the scene. Earlier this year (May and April) Iranians seized two oil tankers.

June 2, 2023: In the northwest the IRGC used UAVs carrying explosives to attack Iranian Kurdish separatists based in northern Iraq.

June 1, 2023: Iran-backed militias in Syria continue firing rockets at American troops in Syria. Sometimes Iran-backed groups in Iraq attack American troops in Iraq. The Americans retaliate and Iran denies any responsibility for the violence.

May 31, 2023: Iranian anti-government hackers group Rise to Overthrow gained access to a government computer network used by senior Iranian officials and made off with documents describing the efforts to build nuclear weapons and new security measures at the Fordow nuclear facility. Earlier this year the IAEA reported that while inspecting Iranian facilities they found traces of uranium enriched to 83.7 percent, just short of the 90 percent required for nuclear weapons. These samples were found at the Fordow processing facility where uranium is only supposed to be enriched to 60 percent.

May 27, 2023: Egypt and Israel continue having problems with Iran encouraging violence in Gaza by sending cash and weapons to pro-Iran Islamic terrorist groups. Currently Iran is encouraging Hamas to boast of its preparations for another war with Israel. Hamas believes that if they can inflict enough damage on Israel by killing or capturing soldiers and civilians they can prompt Moslem and Western countries to pressure Israel to allow more access to Gaza and send more aid. Hamas also hopes that Israel bombs and ground forces do enough damage inside Gaza to allow Hamas to get away with portraying itself as a victim and again persuading other nations to help. This will be difficult because the Arab donors no longer trust Hamas (or Fatah either) and are put off by the recent Iranian announcement that it was still subsidizing Hamas, which has run Gaza and its 1.5 million Palestinians since 2005. Iran supported Hamas early on. There were recently more rumors that Iran had stopped supporting Hamas. Iran had decreased its support, in large part because of Western sanctions for Iranian support of terrorism and lower oil prices, but never cut off Hamas completely. Although Sunni Hamas sometimes persecutes Shia, Iran supports energetic Hamas efforts to attack Israel. Hamas also supports Islamic terrorists active in Egypt, which turned Egypt completely against Hamas and helped put Egypt firmly into the anti-Iran Sunni coalition. The Iran link makes Hamas an enemy as far as most Sunni Moslem nations are concerned. Hamas has made a lot of bad decisions since 2005 and the Iran link is seen as one of the worst. In response to Arab states who have cut aid to Gaza and the West Bank, Palestinian leaders have quietly told the reluctant Arab donors that if they do not increase aid there will be violent Palestinian protests (in Gaza, West Bank and Jerusalem) against the Arab donors as well as Israel. These Arab donors (mainly Gulf oil states like Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait) have lost patience with the Palestinians and not only cut donor aid, which was being stolen or misused by corrupt Palestinian leaders, but also openly allied themselves with Israel against Iran. The Arab world still technically backs the Palestinians and their effort to destroy Israel but has lost confidence in the Palestinians.

By providing sanctuary to Islamic terror groups that operate in Egypt, Hamas has made an enemy of Egypt. Thus, since 2012, Egypt has limited the ability of Gaza residents to enter or leave Gaza via Egypt. Worse, the Egyptians have gone after the smuggling tunnels. The most successful tactic has been filling the smuggling tunnels with water. This began in 2013 when the Egyptians dug small canals for seawater that could then be pumped into tunnels discovered. It was eventually found that flooding permanently destroyed the tunnel better than any other method because it caused the sandy soil in the area to collapse and remain unstable. It is believed that only about twenty tunnels are still operating and every week several of those are discovered and flooded. The army engineers have learned that you have to not only flood the tunnels but keep flooding them because the Palestinians can obtain pumps to remove the water and repair the damage. But if you keep the tunnel flooded long enough it collapses and has to be rebuilt as if there were never a tunnel there in the first place. Egypt has also created a buffer zone along the border by moving Egyptians out and destroying all buildings. This means tunnels from Gaza now have to be over a kilometer long and deeper as well to evade detection. To make matters worse Egyptian police watch buildings within a few kilometers of the Gaza border for signs of a tunnel entrance. The police are less likely to take bribes from smuggling tunnel operators because Gaza-based Islamic terrorists have killed a lot of Egyptian police and soldiers in the last few years.

May 26, 2023: The U.S. Navy wants its Persian Gulf allies to cooperate in using more USVs (Unmanned Surface Vehicles) to increase security in the Gulf, especially the entrance (the Strait of Hormuz). There is certainly a need for more security because Iran recently used commandos landed by helicopter to seize two oil tankers and hold them hostage off the Iranian coast. The larcenous Iranians have also been known to hijack USVs. To better monitor Iranian mischief, the Americans have already deployed fifty USVs in the Gulf and want its Gulf allies to add more of their own. The American USVs are unarmed models like the DriX and Saildrone. Both have long endurance and lots of sensors. With all that in mind it seems like a good idea to use more USVs in the Gulf. Not all the Gulf Arabs are eager to do this and would rather invest in more manned warships. Iranians consider such warships targets for their attacks. The Americans point out that the USVs operate 24/7 and in all sorts of bad weather. They transmit video and radar data back to a land or sea based control center, providing wide coverage of who is doing what throughout the Gulf. The Iranians consider this harassment while the Arabs and their Western allies consider that reaction a sign that all those USVs are getting the job done.

May 25, 2023: Iran conducted a test launch of the updated version of its Khorramshahr ballistic missile. With a range of 2,000 kilometers, it carries a 1.5 ton warhead. The new version now uses storable liquid fuel, which reduces launch preparation time to about 12 minutes. The existence of Khorramshahr was revealed in a 2017 parade. The new missile was test fired in 2017. That test failed but another in 2020 succeeded. Khorramshahr is remarkably similar to the earlier North Korean Hwasong-12. Iran and North Korea have long been secret trading partners. Both nations are heavily sanctioned. Iran has oil that North Korea needs and North Korea has ballistic missile technology that Iran seeks. Iran does not yet have nuclear weapons, so Khorramshahr can only carry a high-explosive or chemical weapon warhead. Iran wants to destroy Israel and ballistic missiles that can carry multiple nuclear warheads and reach Israel. The problem is that Israel has had ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) systems for over a decade that are designed to intercept long-range missiles. Israel already has nuclear weapons and deliver them via ballistic missile, submarine-launched or aircraft-launched cruise missiles. Most Iranians know this and that is another reason their current religious dictatorship is so unpopular.

May 24, 2023: In the west (Ilam Province) a 21 year-old student who was injured during a recent anti-government protest died while in the hospital. The government said the student committed suicide while his family insisted he died of his injuries and the medical staff at the hospital confirmed that. Another twenty protesters were also injured by the violent effort to disperse the protest. These protests began nine-months ago to protest a young woman being killed by the lifestyle police who arrested her for not hearing her hijab head covering properly. The “hijab protests” continue despite the government's use of violence against protesters. Iranians are angry about continued economic problems and increased economic sanctions imposed on Iran because of its support for Russia in the Ukraine War and continued heavy spending to support Iranian violence in Syria.

May 17, 2023: Somalia expelled two EU (European Union) aid officials for taking photos of a Somali prison. This is a problem because Somalia treats its prison inmates more harshly than is the case back in Europe. None of the 36 prisoners involved were Somali and most were Iranian. All had been caught fishing illegally in Somali waters and were imprisoned until the nations they were from could agree on suitable restitution.

May 15, 2023: Iran has become a major source of military equipment, weapons and munitions for Russia. For example, Russian reserves of 152mm artillery munitions are exhausted and production facilities in Russia are unable to supply additional shells quickly enough to refill the depleted war reserve. Russia received 300,000 shells from Iran and a similar amount from North Korea. South Korea maintains a large stockpile of 155mm shells and that has persuaded North Korea to limit the number of shells they send Russia. NATO nations have provided Ukraine with over a million 155mm shells and a smaller quantity of 152mm shells. NATO nations have more production capabilities for artillery shells but not enough to keep the Ukrainians supplied with what they need. This means that both Ukrainian and Russian forces have less artillery ammunition than they need. This favors the Ukrainians, who's attacking forces will face less artillery fire while they are advancing and out in the open.

May 14, 2023: The U.S. has concluded that a March UAV attack on an American base in Syria, which killed a military contractor, was launched by an Iran-backed militia in nearby Iraq.

May 10, 2023: Iran supports Lebanon’s efforts to expel Sunni Arab refugees who have flooded in because of the fighting in Syria. Lebanon has started registering and attempting to deport Syrian refugees. The nearly two million Sunni Arab Syrian refugees that fled to Lebanon since 2012, radically changing the demography of Lebanon. Before 2011 the Lebanese population was only five million. Since nearly all those refugees are Sunni Moslems, it radically changes the religious mix of Lebanon from 27 percent Shia, 27 percent Sunni, and 46 percent Christian (and other religions) to a more volatile combination. With the refugee influx there were now seven million people in Lebanon and 47 percent were Sunni, 19 percent Shia and 34 percent Christian (and others). This put the Hezbollah militia in a bad situation. Their better armed and trained fighters have been able to dominate the other minorities since the 1980s. That was possible because of Iranian cash, weapons and advisors. But the Iranian help and better organization is no longer enough when the Sunnis are nearly half the population and out for blood because of the slaughter the Iran backed Shia Syrian government inflicted on Syrian Sunnis. Lebanon does not want another civil war over this and it was becoming difficult to contain the anger. Hezbollah and Iran have had some success attracting non-Shia factions (especially Christians) to be part of the Shia coalition. This is traditional Lebanese politics, with the Christians surviving by forming a coalition with non-Christian groups. Now even these Christian factions are backing away from Hezbollah. By 2023 Lebanon felt itself capable of dealing with the refugee crisis, especially since large-scale violence in Syria has largely disappeared. There are 5.5 million refugees in neighboring countries. Turkey has 3.6 million, Lebanon two million and 250,000 in Iraq. There are also several million Syrians in Saudi Arabia, who are considered part of the large (over six million foreigners) expatriate workforce. About a third of those workers are Syrians. While many fled to Saudi Arabia because of the war in Syria, they were not treated like refugees and have jobs and status in Saudi Arabia. Countries bordering Syria want their refugees to go home. That cannot happen without the cooperation of the Assads. Syria needs a lot of those refugees to revive the economy and the Arab League is willing to allow Syria to rejoin if they reduce their cooperation with Iran. That has always been a dangerous option for the Assads because the Iranians have enough armed operatives inside Syria to threaten the lives of key Assad clan members. Currently, Iranian power is unusually weak inside Iran and inside Syria. Now is a good time for the Assads to make a break from Iran, especially if he has the support of the Arab League and assurances that the League will help, not hinder Assad use of force to maintain their rule in Syria. Turkey does not belong to the Arab League but is eager to send its Syrian refugee’s home. The Assad offer is acceptable if it will finally get those Syrians out of Turkey. The Assad’s appear to have decided in favor of the Arab League. That outcome of that decision will become known and put into effect sometime this year.

May 8, 2023: Israel began a major effort to kill leaders of Iran-backed PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad), which is based in Gaza and responsible for the growing number of rocket attacks on southern Israel as well as more ambitious operations in the West Bank to kill or kidnap Israelis. Hamas had a major presence in Gaza when they formed JOR (Joint Operations Room). This was a coalition of twelve Palestinian factions seeking, and sometimes succeeding in attacking Israel or individual Israelis. Hamas supervises JOR and supplies rockets and other weapons from Iran. Israel has armed patrol boats operating along the Gaza coast and regularly intercepting Iranian arms shipments trying to land weapons from fishing boats. These shipments have an even more difficult time getting across the Gaza border with Egypt. The Egyptians are often the victims of Iranian weapons and guard their border with Gaza. Israel and Egypt exchange information on Iranian arms shipments and often cooperate in capturing the smugglers trying to get in via Sinai or Iranian smuggling tunnels. Israel had found and killed at least six leaders of the JOR and that encouraged Iran to increase its weapons smuggling efforts.

May 6, 2023: In southern Syria (Daraa province) on the Israeli border, there has been a lot of random violence so far in 2013, with over 200 separate incidents of violence that have caused over 500 casualties. The violence is mainly against Syrian army personnel. This level of violence remained fairly constant since 2018. This is part of the undeclared war between Iranian and Syrian forces going on there since 2018. Anonymous assassins use pistols and hidden bombs to kill those who work, or worked for government forces or Russia and Syria backed local militias. There are also attacks against former members of ISIL and other militant groups. These victims had accepted amnesty. Russian and Assad forces openly force Iran-backed groups and individuals out of the area. There is no open violence because Iran, Syria and Russia are still officially allies. Israel sometimes fires on Iranian forces operating in Daraa, especially near the Israeli border. Israel also shares intel with Russia and Syria about Syrian officers who are secretly working for Iran. The Iranians pay well, and in dollars. Israel will sometimes release evidence of this to the media, so that Iranians back home have another reason to oppose Iranian foreign wars. Negotiations have been underway between Iran and Russia/Syria since 2020 but have not made much progress. The covert Iranian violence is just another incentive for Syria to get the Iranian agents out of the area. In 2022 and 2023 much of the violence is from other groups, some of them criminal gangs retaliating against those who refuse to pay for protection from the violence. Daraa is the most violent province but similar violence continues in many parts of Syria.

May 4, 2023: Visiting Syria for two days, Ebrahim Raisi, the Iranian president, met with key members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. These two terror groups are based in Gaza and depend on Iran for financial support and weapons. Raisi discussed planned terror attacks in southern Israel, the West Bank, Jerusalem and now from Lebanon. Iran forced Hamas to establish a partnership with Hezbollah to recruit Palestinians living in Lebanon to carry out rocket attacks into Israel. The Lebanese are not happy with this because Hamas could get too aggressive and trigger a major Israeli response against Hamas and the larger Hezbollah in southern Lebanon as well as terrorist targets throughout Lebanon. Iran is using a complex and dangerous strategy with all these terrorist groups. For one thing, these groups are divided by religion. Hezbollah and Iran are Shia while Palestinians are Sunni or Christian. Then there is the ethnicity problem. All the Arabs are Semitic while the Iranians are Indo-European and have a history of treating Arabs poorly. Most Lebanese want Iranian and Palestinian radicalism gone from Lebanon, or at least kept quiet. Firing rockets into Israel is dangerous for all Lebanese. Iran is playing a dangerous and explosive game here, one that could backfire on Iran. Most Iranians oppose these expensive sponsorships of Arab terror groups that cost a lot, make a lot of noise and don’t seem to be hurting the Israelis. The popular anger against the government in Iran grows and Raisi has to keep that in mind while working with all these Arab terror groups and their demands for more money. Raisi also met with the Syrian president Bashar Assad to discuss continued cooperation between Syria and Iran as well as problems with Israeli, Islamic terrorist and Turkish operations in Syria, especially the ones aimed at Iranians in Syria. Then there is the Syrian effort to get back in the Arab League and accept large amounts of Arab aid and investment to rebuild Syria’s shattered economy. Iran does not get along with many members of the Arab League while Syria wants to get cozy with the League. In late 2011 Syria was suspended from the Arab League and many of the 21 other League members cut diplomatic relations or imposed sanctions. The Arab League was unable to do much more. By early 2013 the Arab League was still unable to muster enough unity to call for international (Western) intervention in Syria. The Arab League did that in 2011 for Libya and many Arabs considered it shameful that the Arab world could not handle the military intervention itself. Despite trillions of dollars in oil income and hundreds of millions of Arabs demanding something be done, the Arab League had to call on outsiders to save Libya from degenerating into an interminable bloodbath. That is what happened in Syria and many Arabs refused to accept responsibility and just blamed the West and Israel for the mess. Given that toxic atmosphere, Western nations, including NATO member Turkey, were reluctant to do what the Arabs wanted done but would not admit they cannot do it themselves. Iran and the Russians intervened in support of the Assads and the slaughter of pro-rebel civilians continued as did Assad efforts to force pro-rebel civilians out of Syria.

May 3, 2023: Russian air strikes against Ukrainian cities using Iranian Shahed-136s resulted in one of the UAVs having engine trouble and landing intact. This enabled Ukrainian and foreign investigators to scrutinize the construction of the Shahed-136. Most of these that run into engine problems crash and explode. This one had been given contaminated fuel that caused the UAV to gradually descend and hit the ground without enough impact to set off the warhead contact fuze.

Obtaining an intact aircraft allowed for a more thorough inspection to be done. The MD-550 engine was built in Iran and it was confirmed that this was indeed an illegal copy of the German L-550 engine. Iran had obtained one of these engines in 2006 and used it in several UAVs, including Shahed-136. The L-550 entered production in the 1980s and was a popular engine for ultralight aircraft and UAVs. Legal copies of the L-550 cost about $15,000 each. That means a Shahed-136 costs about twice the original estimate of $20,000 each. A Shahed-136 weighs 200 kg (440 pounds) and is armed with a warhead containing 30 to 50 kg, most of it explosives. That’s not a lot because most cruise missiles carry warheads weighing half a ton (500 kg) or more. The Shahed-136 warhead will damage, not destroy, most structures it hits. Shahed-136 is launched using a rocket motor that gets it into the air and then detaches and falls away.

May 2, 2023: The media watchdog “Reporters Without Borders” (RSF) has placed Iran near the bottom of its World Press Freedom Index for the fifth year in a row. North Korea ranks last, at 180th place, followed by China (179th), Vietnam (178th), Iran (177th) and Turkmenistan (176th).