August 1, 2023: The 2022 invasion of Ukraine has been a disaster for Russia, because Russian troops ran into unexpected and very effective Ukrainian resistance. Russia lost more troops in less than a year of fighting in Ukraine than they did during eight years of fighting in Afghanistan during the 1980s. Russia did have one success because of the Ukraine War, but that occurred in Russia, not Ukraine. Back in Russia, many people opposed the war. While the Russian government portrayed the fighting in Ukraine as an effort to keep NATO from harming Russia, it was obvious that no one was invading or attacking Russia and that it was Russians that invaded Ukraine. Like the Germans who invaded Russia in 1941, where they were on the defensive by 1944. the Russians invading Ukraine were soon on the defensive and could be driven out in another year or so.

Fourteen months after Russia invaded Ukraine, the Ukrainians are attacking and driving the Russian forces out. This was bad news for the Russian government, which was receiving growing criticism from its citizens about not merely the war’s cost, but the need for it at all. The government responded to the internal criticism and did so more effectively than their military efforts in Ukraine. Russia declared criticism of the Russian war effort in Ukraine illegal. Arrested were made and some critics went on trial. This discouraged some Russian critics but emboldened others. Thit sort of thing was uncommon in Russia.

Throughout most of its history, Russia has been a police state. In addition to the secret police, Russia also intercepted and read mail and overheard radio and telephone conversations. Russia mobilized support inside Russia for detecting anonymous critics and threatening them with arrest if they did not curb their criticism.

This criticism made it obvious that the Russian government was losing the support of its own people, including a growing number of senior officers who spoke out, usually via encrypted messages on Telegram, a popular cell phone app in Russia and Ukraine. Early on many of these Russian Telegram based military bloggers (“mil-bloggers”) supported the invasion and were supplied with information by the Russian government, including opportunities to spend some time with the troops inside Ukraine. After a few months the Russian mil-bloggers were no longer reporting the official Russian version of events in Ukraine, but what was being reported by Russian veterans of the fighting.

After Russia announced a pause in offensive military operations in early July, one of these mil-bloggers, a former general who had served in occupied Donbas before the invasion, reported a different reality. He insisted that Russia had suffered higher losses in eastern Ukraine (Luhansk province) than the Ukrainians, who were conducting a classic attrition defense. The Russians had suffered far more losses in men and equipment. Ukrainians were not driven out of Luhansk, but withdrew slowly and deliberately to encourage Russia to keep attacking and losing troops and combat vehicles that could not be replaced. Meanwhile the Ukrainians were receiving more weapons and equipment from NATO and forming new units, including armed resistance groups in occupied Ukraine. This was not the official Russian assessment but it was the reality that Russian troops in Ukraine were experiencing and some Russian mil-bloggers were reporting.

All this was nothing new. When the most modern and effective Russian forces were assembled to invade Ukraine in 2022, they quickly discovered they were not facing an inept, poorly trained and armed foe but one that was far more effective than the Russian invaders. The main offensive in the north, towards the nearby Ukrainian capital Kyiv, suffered heavy losses and within weeks was forced to withdraw back to the border. Russian troops were initially told that they had encountered NATO troops who were in Ukraine preparing to invade Russia. The surviving troops knew better because all they encountered were Ukrainians, usually armed with weapons similar to what Russia used as well as more effective ones they had received from NATO. The Ukrainians used more effective tactics and some new weapons that were based on Western models but Ukrainian- made. The Russian state-controlled media was ordered to ignore reports like this and stick with the official story that this was all a secret NATO operation to attack Russia via Ukraine.

While this information war played on, the Russian ordered everything they had, short of nuclear and chemical weapons, into use in an effort to salvage the situation. Russia was at war with a near-peer opponent and losing. Many Russians, civilian and military, figured out what was happening and openly criticized, or sometimes even physically attacked, their government because of the mess in Ukraine that was killing a lot of Russian troops. These Russian critics were often well-educated professionals in regular contact with Westerners, including more than a million Russians who had left since 2014 because of fears Russia was headed for what actually happened in 2022. Several hundred thousand more departed after the 2022 invasion. Despite this, the majority of Russians accepted the government explanation that Russian was defending itself in Ukraine and that what the government called the “special military operation” must continue. Russia refused to call what they were doing in Ukraine as war.

Russia encountered major problems trying to control information made available to its people. This became a critical problem after the invasion of Ukraine and the government wanted to conceal the extent of their military failures. Passing new laws against disclosing such information and shutting down the last few media operations that were not state-controlled were not enough. The ban on casualty information created a lot of public protest that found ways to get past the censorship.

The Russian government persevered and was eventually successful at organizing effective resistance to internal criticism by Russian officials and civilians. This was done by relying on the growing number of Russian firms that were developing new tools to read encrypted messages and track those who were anonymously news of the Ukraine War that was critical of Russian efforts. The FSB, the Russian secret police that replaced the Cold War era KGB in the 1990s, encouraged the establishment and growth of Russian companies that were developing new tools for the KGB to use for detecting, tracking and eavesdropping on the communications of Russian critics who thought they were safe when using encrypted apps like WhatsApp and Telegram.

These efforts to track the users of encrypted apps and even decrypt some of the messages had some success. Despite that Russians continue criticizing their government, especially the continued fighting in Ukraine. Portions of Ukraine still under Russian control were being pacified by moving Ukrainians to Russia and an uncertain future. The departed Ukrainians were supposed to be replaced, but weren’t, by Russians willing to risk living in a disputed area for a reward of free housing in as the empty homes of the forcibly removed Ukrainians. Somehow no Russian civilians have accepted this offer. Russia has already been condemned for sending the young children of, especially orphans, and sending the kids to Russia for adoption by Russian couples. This sort of thing appalls many Russians because Russian history books describe similar behavior by German invaders during World War II. The Russian government denies any similarities between its activities in Ukraine now and what the German invaders did inside Russia nearly 80 years ago. Russia declared it illegal to spread such ideas. There were a few arrests, but that was also unpopular and the prison system could not handle a large number of Russians convicted of thought crimes.

Successful government tracking and identification of Russians criticizing their government was seen as a victory against the spread of anti-Russian information on the Internet. However, this did little to stop Russians from discussing and criticizing government misbehavior. The government is undeterred and continues to reward Russians and Russian firms that come up with new tools to decrypt encrypted messages and track the extent of this critical information and who was involved.

Coping

Lack of success in Ukraine soon became a problem for the Russian government and the Russian media. Russian leader Vladimir Putin does not tolerate public criticism. After all, he began his career as a Soviet KGB officer. Back then openly criticizing the KGB was against the law and violators were jailed or simply died under mysterious circumstances. Putin revived those practices after the invasion of Ukraine turned out to be a disaster for Russia. Now the Ukrainians are counter-attacking with the goal of driving Russians out of Ukraine entirely. Another embarrassing aspect of the Ukraine fighting was that the Ukrainian received over $80 billion in military and other aid from NATO countries while no one was helping Russia. Several groups in Russia have opinions on why this is so and not all of these opinions agree with each other.

Some Russians see the invasion of Ukraine as necessary if Russia is to negotiate with the West on an equal basis. The invasion triggered an unprecedented degree of Western economic sanctions, which kept Russian leaders busy developing methods to cope with the economic impact, especially on ordinary Russians. Vladimir Putin first established power in Russia two decades ago by paying attention to the standard of living for Russians, especially those surviving on a pension. This made Putin very popular, although that popularity has diminished the longer Russian forces were struggling in Ukraine. This has encouraged the more radical supporters of Putin’s foreign policy, some of it because Russia was losing. An example of this was the “angry Russia” faction that opposes any efforts to negotiate with the West. Demands are preferred but the more Russia struggles in Ukraine the less likely anyone in the West wants to trust or negotiate with Russia. This is because Russia tends to break agreements made with the West and blame the West for forcing Russia to take drastic action.

Despite many failures, Putin remains in power but the growing list of threats is eroding that power. Russians like a strong leader, but there is a limit to how many of the leader’s mistakes they will tolerate. This has created a bad situation for Putin because the most common causes of wars are territorial disputes and overconfidence by the aggressor. The current war in Ukraine is the result of over a decade of bad decisions by Russian leaders, particularly Putin, who has been running Russia for over two decades despite term-limits laws and continued, but futile, popular opposition.

The first actual invasion of Ukraine occurred in 2014 after five days of popular protests in Ukraine forced a pro-Russia Ukrainian president to flee to Russia. Victor Yanukovych had won the 2010 presidential election because of promises to seek greater economic and diplomatic links with the West. At that point Russia had been interfering in Ukrainian affairs for over a decade in an effort to prevent Ukraine from becoming more Western and less subservient to Russia. Yanukovych was bribed by the Russians to renege on his election promises about closer links with the West. In late 2013 Yanukovych was supposed to sign a political association and free trade agreement with the EU (European Union). To the surprise of the Ukrainians who voted for him, Yanukovych refused to sign the EU agreement and announced he was going to seek closer ties with Russia. This triggered a popular uprising demanding he resign. At first Yanukovych tried using violence to suppress what came to be called the Maidan Revolution. Over a hundred protesters were killed but the number of protesters in Kyiv grew and Yanukovych fled to Russia. The Ukrainian parliament then voted to officially remove Yanukovych from office and an interim president was selected to arrange new elections and sign the EU agreement. Petro Poroshenko was elected president in May 2014.

Russia was dismayed by the removal of Yanukovych and turned to more violent solutions to their Ukraine problems. Russia declared that former Ukrainian president Yanukovych was still the legitimate president and had him write a letter requesting Russian military assistance in Crimea, where the new Ukrainian government was threatening to cancel the lease Russia had for their naval base. Russia was providing Yanukovych with sanctuary and protection from prosecution for crimes he was accused of in Ukraine.

Russia was acting on its belief that three Ukrainian provinces, Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk should be part of Russia because most of the people in those provinces were Russian speakers and could be persuaded to voluntarily join Russia. This turned out to be only partially true. Many of the Russians in Crimea were military personnel and their families, living there because of the continued use of Sevastopol as the Black Sea Fleet headquarters. Russia prepared a surprise operation that involved the 22nd and 45th GRU (Military Intelligence) spetsnaz (special operations) regiments, which were part of the Russian military force but not identified as spetsnaz. There were only a few hundred spetsnaz in Crimea but Ukrainians soon were able to recognize the “little green men” with weapons and lots of attitude wearing uniforms with no insignia. Also identified were recently (after the takeover began) arrived members of the infamous (for brutal but effective special operations in Chechnya) Vostok battalion and an airborne unit (31st Airborne Brigade) that showed up in a lot of tricky situations (Bosnia, Chechnya, Georgia). In other words, what foreign intelligence agencies have come to regard as The Usual Suspects whenever there is an operation requiring special operations forces.

Ukraine appealed to the West for help, not just a trade deal. Putin’s actions in Ukraine had brought Ukraine closer to the west and finally actively sought NATO membership. Putin had invoked grievances with NATO and sought to resolve them by claiming they went into Ukraine to annex it to Russia. This was considered necessary to restore Ukraine to its status as part of Russia. Putin later claimed that he was seeking to restore other areas to Russian control.

Putin eventually named portions of Poland as one of its future targets for absorption into “Greater Russia”, otherwise known as the Russian empire. Belarus, the Baltic States and some former Soviet territories in Central Asia are also on the acquisition list. None of these targets were willing to cooperate. Poland, as the largest and wealthiest East European NATO member, led the way by rearming to confront any future threat. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Poland decided to increase the size of the armed forces to 300,000 personnel and spend at least three percent of GDP on defense. NATO suggests two percent of GDP but few European NATO members spent that much on defense. Now more NATO members are reaching or exceeding two percent and the increases are higher the closer a country is to Russia.

The NATO nations near or bordering Russia insist that, if Russia is allowed to keep any Ukrainian territory, the Russians will attack them too as part of an effort to reconstitute the Greater Russia that the tsars and later communists created and maintained until 1991. Russian leader Vladimir Putin has always insisted that the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a big mistake and must be rectified. Many Russians agree with that, but are less willing to pay the economic and military price that Ukraine demonstrated would result if Russia tried.

Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan are nervous because they are, after Ukraine, according to Vladimir Putin, on the list of former Soviet territories that must be absorbed into Greater Russia. That would be difficult because these three states have growing economic ties with China and diplomatic ties with India and the West.

Greater Russia was not just about rebuilding the tsarist or communist empires because Russia does not want the expensive of ruling Central Asian states, but rather more lucrative territories Russian once ruled. This includes portions of Poland, all of the Baltic States and Finland, and parts of Alaska. There are some serious legal and practical problems with these claims. The United States has a larger military and nukes which might come into play to deal with efforts to enforce any Russian claims on Alaska. Russia is making claims on several Eastern European NATO members who are protected by the mutual defense clause of the NATO treaty.

Russia and all the nations involved are members of the United Nations. Article 51 of the UN charter demands that members refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. Russia says this does not apply because Ukraine is a breakaway part of Russia and Russian troops are seeking to liberate Ukraine from foreign (NATO) oppression. Ukraine is also a UN member and protests Russian claims as well as the UN tolerating the Russian use of its Security Council veto to block any serious UN opposition to the Russian aggression.

Ukraine pointed out that the Ukrainian forces will force Russian troops out of Ukraine and then the problem will be what the rest of the world does about Russia. Putin’s decisions have led Western and even some Russian media to describe Putin as out of control. Ukraine was one of many unpopular Putin decisions. Another one was the effort to sever access to the Internet outside of Russia. Only a few government and commercial operations would have access to the Internet beyond Russia’s borders. Putin has had this system tested in early July and there were still major problems that had to be fixed before he could sever international Internet access for most Russians and create Sovereign Internet for Russia and end access to the international Internet. This was not popular with most Russian Internet users.

Putin appears to go out of his way with actions and statements that further diminish his popularity inside Russia. There are still like-minded Russians who agree with Putin, but their number dwindles as each new scheme backfires and makes things worse for Russia.

July 31, 2023: In the Black Sea, an Israeli cargo ship defied the Russian naval blockade and entered Ukrainian waters, followed by four other cargo ships. An American P8 maritime surveillance aircraft flew overhead searching for any Russian naval activity. The Russian threat was not backed up by the presence of any warships, because doing so would make the Russian ships targets for Ukrainian anti-ship missiles or small, fast unmanned bomb boats.

Russia admitted that they had deported 4.8 million Ukrainian civilians to Russia since early 2022. The Geneva Convention considers such forcible deportations illegal while Russia describes it as a military necessity to reduce armed resistance in Russian occupied portions of Ukraine. Russia now considers these territories part of Russia. International law does not recognize such annexations.

Russia increased fines for men who do not report for military service. There are also fines for organizations, commercial or government, that do not accurately report the number and Ids of military age men on the payroll. Western analysts believe that Russia has lost (killed, seriously wounded, captured or missing) 250,000 soldiers since early 2022 and has outlawed the release of information on troop losses and threatens to prosecute anyone who releases that data anyway. It doesn’t make much difference in Russia, where the personal experiences of so many people, as expressed in social media, seems to confirm the Western estimates. To make matters worse the Ukrainian military continues to release transcripts of cell phone calls made by Russian soldiers in Ukraine to wives or other family members in Russia describing the losses and lack of support (supplies, replacements) they suffer from. This lack of support has led to many Russian soldiers not fighting when ordered to attack or defend. The troops will prepare fortifications, operate artillery and plant mines and explosive devices, and this is what causes most Ukrainian casualties. The Ukrainian troops find fewer Russian soldiers actively attacking or even fighting back. The Russian government has declared it a criminal act for soldiers to surrender. Those who do so will be imprisoned if they are eventually released and return to Russia.

Many of these complaints are made by Russian officers, who are reluctant to threaten their troops with punishment for not fighting. There is fear of mutiny by the miserable Russian troops. Officers deal with this problem by avoiding it and not doing anything that will further anger their troops and report to their superiors that everything is fine, except for the lack of supplies and replacements. The government attitude seems to be that they will increase punishments until troop morale improves. The government has also tried to suppress much of the bad news coming from the Ukrainian front. State-controlled media will not report what is really going on and the government tries to convince the Internet-based Russian commentators to limit their reporting of the bad news in Ukraine. Russian leaders, especially Vladimir, fear a rebellion inside Russia against the government for all the problems the Russian invasion of Ukraine has caused for Russia.

July 30, 2023: In Moscow, a Ukrainian cruise missile (a UAV carrying explosives on a one-way mission) damaged an office tower. Several other similar cruise missiles were intercepted. Ukraine carries out these attacks as symbolic retaliation because of the more damaging Russian missile attacks on Ukrainian cities.

Ukrainian artillerymen have been using Iranian made shells and unguided rockets apparently captured from the Russians. Many of these munitions were manufactured recently (2023) or in the last year. Iran has been providing Russia with as many munitions as the Russians can pay for. North Korea has also been providing Russia with rockets and shells but these are often the oldest ones in the North Korean inventory. It’s preferable to sell these munitions, some of them 30 years old, before they become too dangerous to use. Although these shells and rockets will still work, many of them do so unreliably. That means many of these shells and rockets no longer are as accurate or able to reach their maximum range or even detonate when they hit the ground. Ukrainian EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) teams are kept busy dealing with all these unexploded munitions in the combat zone as well as in towns and cities where the unexploded munitions are a threat to civilians.

July 29, 2023: In southern Ukraine (Kherson province) the Chongar Strait railroad bridge was put out of action by a Storm Shadow guided bomb that cratered a portion of the bridge and rendered the rails unusable. Russia denied this but photos reached the West showing the damage in detail and satellite photos showed the damage in less detail. This disrupts rail traffic for at least a few days and possibly a week as repairs are made. The highway link had already been broken. This is the only rail link between Kherson province and the Crimean Peninsula. The other rail and road link is the Kerch Strait bridge, which was completed in 2018 at a cost of nearly four billion dollars. It is the main supply route between Russia and Crimea but has been rendered unusable for rail or road traffic by missile and underwater bomb attacks. Supply lines for Russian forces in Crimea are temporarily cut and Ukrainian missiles have destroyed most of the fuel and ammunition supplies already in the Crimean Peninsula. Ukrainian ground forces are advancing from the north towards the narrow land connection between the mainland and the Crimean Peninsula. Russian ground forces in the area were able to slow down the Ukrainian offensive but not stop it. The Ukrainians have more troops in their area than the Russians and now the Russian supply lines are cut.

July 27, 2023: Russia continues attacking Ukrainian cities with guided missiles. Ukrainian air defenses have been able to intercept most of them but some get through causing damage and casualties. Recent attacks have also hit the port of grain storage sites and the port of Odessa. Russia is seeking to disrupt Ukrainian grain exports. Russia has previously left those alone because a lot of that grain when to countries Russia was still on good terms with. Russia had threatened to make these attacks unless some of the Western economic sanctions were lifted. That did not happen so the Russians went after Ukrainian food exports. This was unpopular with many countries that were still on good terms with Russia but saw Russian efforts to block Ukrainian grain exports as raising the world grain prices by 15 percent initially. That would grow if Russia managed to block all Ukrainian access to Black Sea trade routes.

July 26, 2023: In southeast Ukraine, the Ukrainian offensive finally broke through Russian fortifications and minefields and threatened to cut the block Russian access to the Crimean Peninsula. While the Russians had built numerous fortifications and minefields in the area, Russian troops were few and generally reluctant to put up a stiff resistance. Soldiers complained of food and ammunition shortages as well as receiving no reinforcements for a long time. The Russian troop shortage was getting worse because losses were not being replaced and soldiers still in the area felt abandoned. This was sometimes literally the case when officers departed on leave or official business and didn’t return. While surrendering to the Ukrainians was discouraged, it was more common now. Russian officers are empowered to shoot soldiers who try to surrender but that is not as effective as it was last year when there were more Russian in Ukraine. Now the troops will sometimes shoot back. The Russian defenders were dismayed at how the Ukrainians were only stalled for days or weeks by the fortifications, minefields and occasional Russian artillery fire, but eventually worked their way through. While the Ukrainians had some new German Leopard 2 tanks and more numerous American Bradley and Stryker IFV (Infantry Fighting Vehicles), most of the Ukrainian armored vehicles were the older Russian models that both Ukrainian and Russian troops use. The only Russian reinforcements was the occasional appearance of Russian Ka-52 helicopter gunships.

The key factor was the morale and training of the troops and the Ukrainians had a decisive edge. Russia lost about 40 Ka-52s in Ukraine so far and has only been able to replace a few of them. The Ka-52s are vulnerable to ground fire and short range anti-aircraft missiles. The Ka-52s have adopted tactics that involve the use of long range fire with some ATGM (Anti-tank guided missiles) and unguided rockets as well as a 30mm autocannon. There have only 460 rounds of 30mm ammunition. The Ka-52 has a one man on board to fly the helicopter and operate the weapons.

July 25, 2023: Russia raised the maximum age at which men can be conscripted from 27 to 30. Russian men are usually conscripted at 18 for their one year of military service. Many are deferred for one reason or another but can be called up later. Now “later” means when the men are 30 years old. Russia has also been raising the ages that former soldiers can be recalled. Veterans as old as 50 can be mobilized into the military and officers as old as 70.

July 24, 2023: In Syria, Russian jet fighters continue to harass American MQ-9 UAVs by flying to close or launching flares at the unmanned aircraft. Russia doesn’t want a war with the Americans in Syria, but is not reluctant to express hostility.

July 23, 2023: China continues to increase its military exports to Russia. Early in 2022 China said it would not send weapons but could supply supplies like helmets, protective vests and battlefield medical equipment and supplies. By the end of 2022 China was selling Russia more dangerous military items. These included dual-use electronic equipment and some decidedly more dangerous items like electronic signal jammers and replacement parts for combat aircraft. China ignored criticism of its military exports because China wants to see Russia at least survive its poor decision to invade Ukraine. China openly criticized Russia for the invasion and wants to minimize the damage to Russia. China has long maintained trade relations with Ukraine and wants to resume that trade as soon as possible.

July 20, 2023: Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine, Western countries united in imposing severe economic sanctions on Russia. This did some damage to the Russian economy, but not as much as the sanctioning countries expected. This is because there were other countries with current or previous experience evading sanctions and willing to help Russia. Outlaw states tend to cooperate, or at least share sanction evasion techniques with each other. Russia found that nearby Iran, which has been under varying degrees of sanctions for decades, was a good source of advice on evading sanctions. Even before Russia went total outlaw in Ukraine, they had been cooperating with Iran, North Korea and several other heavily sanctioned nations.

Russian oil exports, which for decades have been about eight million BDP (Barrels Per Day), vary in value depending on the world price for oil. In the last decade there have been two instances of sanctions related declines in Russian oil exports. The first was in 2014, in response to the Russian occupation of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine. Russian oil exports fell about ten percent from their normal level. Russian oil exports recovered quickly to their previous levels but oil income remained lower because Russia had to use discounts to get past the oil sanctions. This was because nations caught obtaining sanctioned oil could themselves be sanctioned. In 2022, Russia was hit with even heavier sanctions that caused oil income for 2022 to decline by over 20 percent compared to the previous year.

Russian oil exports cannot be ignored because Russia is the second largest oil exporter, behind Saudi Arabia. During periods when Russian oil exports are sanctioned, the primary impact is Russia receiving less cash for its oil. Russia managed to quickly deal with the new sanctions because of its close relationships with Iran, a veteran practitioner of how best to evade sanctions. Russia continues to evade sanctions any way it can and often succeeds.

July 15, 2023: Iran is one of the few nations willing to supply Russia with munitions for use by Russian forces inside Ukraine. Iran has considerably depleted its artillery ammunition inventory in order to do this. The latest deal involved 14,000 152mm shells for D20 towed howitzers, 10,000 high-explosive shells for T-72 tank guns as well as two T-72 replacement barrels and two replacement barrels for the 122mm D30 towed howitzers. These guns and ammo are sold to Russia, and not at a discount. Russia needs more artillery and shells for its big guns. Iran is one of the few foreign suppliers available.

Ukraine received Western towed or truck-mounted 155mm howitzers and found them superior to the Russian 122mm artillery. Russia had some 5.7-ton D20 152mm howitzers and to obtain more they had to bring many out of storage facilities. The 152mm guns were in pretty good shape but some of the stockpiled 152mm shells were well past their “use by '' date and some of these elderly shells were no longer reliable. This usually meant less range than the standard 17.4 kilometers, or not detonating when hitting the ground. In one case an elderly shell exploded as it was being fired and destroyed the D20 barrel.

One of the more visible of these Iranian munitions is the Shahed-136. These delta wing airborne cruise missiles weigh 200 kg (440 pounds) and are armed with a warhead weighing 30 to 50 kg, most of which is explosives. That’s not a lot because most cruise missiles carry warheads weighing half a ton or more. The Shahed-136 warhead will damage, not destroy, most structures it hits. Shahed-136 is launched using a rocket motor that gets it into the air and then detaches and falls away. To be effective Shahed-136 is launched in swarms, which was the case with this attack. Shahed-136 is propeller driven using a noisy gasoline engine. Aptly described as low (altitude), slow and loud, Shahed-136 is easy to detect and shoot down. Despite these shortcomings Russia continues to use any Shahed-136s it can get for use against civilian targets. This forces Ukraine to use some of its air defense resources to protect civilians from the Shahed-136 attacks.

July 14, 2023: The 2022 invasion of Ukraine alarmed other countries that were created when the Soviet Union was dismantled in 1991. The Stans of Central Asia have another option; China. The Stans (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have been very receptive to Chinese diplomatic and economic cooperation. This bothers Russia, but not to the extent that threats are being made, as was the case with the former imperial provinces to the west. The five “Stans” of Central Asia welcomed Chinese economic activity because it would help with their economies and discourage the Russians from trying to dominate the region like they have done since the 19th century. The invasion of Ukraine was accompanied by some Russian officials speaking openly about who was next. The Stans were usually at the top of the list. The Stans also have a problem with never having been democracies. When the Russians conquered them in the 19th century, the local governments were monarchies or tribes. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, their formerly Soviet leaders held elections and manipulated the vote to get themselves elected "president for life." But many people in the Stans want clean government and democracy, as well as continued independence from Russia. China is no help with that because the Chinese prefer dictators.

In eastern Syria (Homs province) a Russian AN-30 surveillance aircraft flew over the American controlled crossing at Tanf (or Tanaf) near the Jordan and Iraq borders. The Americans have too much airpower and too much aerial and ground surveillance around Tanf for anyone to successfully attack it. The U.S. has declared a “free fire” zone that means any Syrian or Iranian forces getting within 30 kilometers of Tanf are automatically attacked. This often does not apply to unarmed surveillance aircraft, especially if they are Russian. American and Russian forces in Syria sometimes cooperate with each other but that cooperation halted as Russian losses in Ukraine increased.

July 13, 2023: Russia and Iran agreed to create electricity transmission networks built from Iran through Azerbaijan to Russia. This link enables Russia and Iran to export surplus electricity to each other. Peak consumption for Russia occurs in the winter, while peak consumption for Iran occurs in the summer.

July 11, 2023: Russia was alarmed that Tukey was allowing NATO personnel to examine Russian air defense systems delivered to Turkey. This occurred because Turkey recently decided their membership in NATO was more important than maintaining good relations with Russia. Turkey was criticized by its NATO allies in 2017, and praised by Russia for deciding to buy the Russian S-400 air defense system rather than ones used by its NATO allies. Turkey ordered $2.5 billion worth of S-400 systems from Russia and this was criticized by NATO allies. The United States canceled the Turkish order for F-35 stealth fighters. By 2020 Russia had delivered four S-400 batteries and was deploying them on its borders. Two years later Russia invaded Ukraine and the Turks began to reconsider their S-400 purchase. Russia had the money and Turkey remembered why it joined NATO in the first place; to discourage Russia from attacking, or threatening to attack Turkey. More recently It was revealed that Turkey had allowed NATO allies to send technical experts to examine S-400 components, especially the 91N6 radar used for early detection of targets. This is supposed to be up to up to 230 kilometers for ballistic missiles, up to 390 kilometers for aerodynamic (aircraft or cruise missiles) targets while targets of the "strategic bomber" can be detected at up to 570 kilometers. This provided information on exactly how S-400 worked and how best to exploit any flaws in the system. The United States was also looking for illegally obtained American components.

July 10, 2023: In Russia (Moscow) Russian officials and members of the Arab GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) met and agreed that Libya must decide for itself what its future will be. It was also agreed that all foreign troops should leave Libya. Currently this means forces from Turkey and Russia. The Russians are willing to leave if the Turks do so as well. Turkey will not withdraw its forces until agreements it signed with the Tripoli government are acknowledged by all Libyans as legitimate and binding. Russia does agree that a unified Libyan government was needed to settle issues like the Turkish agreements with the Tripoli faction. Russia supports the eastern faction with weapons and equipment and Russian forces have never actively engaged infighting anyone in Libya. Russian has good relations with the GCC, mainly because Russia is a major oil producer. There was also agreement between Russia and its Arab Gulf State allies that the UAE (United Arab Emirates) is justified in disputing ownership of three islands in the Persian Gulf that are currently occupied by Iran. Russia is currently seeking to maintain good relations with both Iran and the Arab Gulf states. Openly choosing sides in the three islands dispute proved to be a mistake for Russia. For over fifty years Iran has defended its possession of three disputed islands in the Persian Gulf. The UAE persists in disputing possession of three islands (Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa), which Iran seized by force in 1971, and refuses to give back. Iran ignores the fact that Arabs live on the islands and would rather be ruled by Arabs.

July 9, 2023: Despite Russian objections, Turkey has sent five former Ukrainian prisoners of war back to Ukraine. The men were released to Turkish custody as part of a prisoner exchange Turkey arranged in 2022. Russia accuses Turkey of violating the terms of the agreement.

July 8, 2023: In CAR, (Central African Republic) several hundred Russian Wagner Group mercenaries have left in the last few weeks. This was described as a rotation of forces. Other Wagner mercenaries will soon arrive as replacements.

July 7, 2023: Russia continues to support profitable military operations in Africa. For example, gold is used to pay the Russian Wagner Group mercenaries that were hired by the Mali military government in 2021 to train Mali troops, especially in the use of weapons purchased from Russia. The supply of Russian weapons, and Wagner mercenaries was disrupted in February 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine and heavy sanctions were imposed on Russia by NATO countries. African countries didn’t care what Russia was doing in Ukraine but did care about their disrupted weapons supply line from Russia. There are about a thousand Wagner personnel in Mali and the Mali military government has no problem paying the mercenaries or for weapons purchased from Russia. Mali is a major producer of gold and the Russians will take payment in gold. Russia maintains a huge gold stockpile (about 2,300 tons), the fifth largest in the world. The Russian gold is an emergency fund that is now being tapped to pay for military operations in Ukraine.

July 6, 2023: The UAV (drone) production facility Iran agreed to help Russia build inside Russia has been completed and is producing UAVs. The new factory is on the Volga River, some 900 kilometers east of Moscow. This location was selected because it is close to the ship canal that connects Russia and Iran. Russia is currently upgrading the canal connection. Growing trade with Iran led Russia to start bringing in dredging equipment for a major, and overdue, dredging of the heavily used Volga-Don Canal that enables ships to get from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea. Because of the war in Ukraine and Iran supplying weapons and equipment to Russia, canal traffic was up 15 percent in 2022 over the previous year and will be even higher in 2023. Since 1952, a 101 kilometers long canal, linking the Don and Volga rivers, gave the Caspian Sea access to the Black Sea and the world's oceans. However, the largest ships that can use the canal cannot displace more than 5,000 tons and be no more than 140 meters (434 feet) long, 17 meters (52 feet) wide, and have a draft of no more than 3.5 meters (10.8 feet). Normally the canal moves over 12 million tons of cargo a year. About half of that is oil or oil products. In 2021 Russia agreed to allow Iran to use the Volga-Don Canal so that Iranian ships can reach the Black Sea from the landlocked Caspian Sea. This is the first time Russia has ever given a foreign nation free access to the canal. Russia and Iran are now using each other’s Caspian Sea ports heavily for trade and getting Iranian weapons and weapons components to Russia. This includes Iranian UAV components for the Russian UAV factory. Both nations have agreed to establish a joint-shipbuilding operation in the Caspian Sea and cooperate in dredging the canal, something that has not been done since 1991. The prolonged lack of dredging has made portions of the canal shallower and forced ships to carry less cargo. The 13 locks on the canal connect the Volga River, the longest in Russia that empties into the Caspian, and the Don River which empties into the Sea of Azov, which is connected to the Black Sea via the Kerch Strait. The Caspian is the world's largest lake and it is huge, at 371,000 square kilometers (about the same size as Poland). It is about a thousand kilometers long and 430 kilometers wide. It's saline but is only about a third as salty as ocean water. The Caspian has a 7,000-kilometer-long coastline, with the largest chunk (1,900 kilometers) belonging to Kazakhstan. A current drought in the region has reduced canal traffic become of the locks don’t have sufficient water supplies to operate the canal locks at full capacity. That drought is most severe in Iran, which is another reason for Iranians to protest the inability of their government to address a problem that previous governments were able to handle.

July 5, 2023: Russia carried out a brief pre-dawn test of its ability to turn Internet access for Russians into a Sovereign Internet that is not connected to the worldwide Internet. That means Russians can only use the Internet within Russian and must use Russian based websites and network services, like search, messaging and social media. There are versions of all these services based in Russian as well as internationally popular versions like Google, Wikipedia, Twitter and Facebook. The Sovereign Internet test revealed some problems, like interference with large scale Internet-based communications systems created for the Nationwide Railroad Network and other nationwide communications systems that also require some access to international systems. A long-term implementation of Russia’s Sovereign Internet would disrupt some portions of the Russian economy that depend on constant communication with foreign firms.

In eastern Syria (Homs province) an American MC-12 intelligence and surveillance aircraft was harassed by a Russian Su-35 fighter. The MC-12 is a 5.6-t0n twin-engine is a Beechcraft Super King Air 350ER modified for miliary use. The crew consists of two pilots and two sensor operators. No damage was done to the MC-12 but those in the aircraft had to momentarily ignore their mission to deal with what the Su-35 might do next. The Su-35 soon flew away.

July 3, 2023: The high casualty rates in Russian combat units sent to Ukraine has led to increasing protests from wives and mothers of men conscripted or “mobilized” (persuaded or forced to join) into the army. The government quickly outlawed publication of casualty statistics. The ban applied to the conventional media as well as the growing number of news outlets on the Internet. The Internet is notoriously difficult to censor, especially when it comes to very emotional issues like husbands, sons and brothers going, willingly or unwillingly, into the military during war time. This is especially true during wars with very high casualty rates. Such was the case for Russians during the two World Wars. After 1945 Russia managed to avoid major wars for more than three decades. That changed when the Soviet Union leaders ignored warnings from the military and ordered an invasion of Afghanistan. That led to unprecedented public protests from the families of soldiers killed and later families of soldiers in Afghanistan. For the first time in Russian history, the military made an effort to return the bodies of soldiers killed in battle. Because the bodies were decaying, zinc-lined wooden coffins were used. Returning the bodies to their families did not reduce the protests and soon wives and mothers were openly conducting “zinc coffin” protests. The public protests contributed to the Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan and the collapse of the Soviet Union a few years later. Thirty years later it’s happening all over again. The government still has no way to halt the protests and the widespread availability of the Internet, especially on cell phones, makes the protests more visible and immediate these days. The government has discovered that such protests interfere with its recruiting efforts. The old lies and false promises no longer work. The military is still getting new troops, but not as many or as quickly as they want. The new recruits are more aware of poor preparation (training and equipment) and combat leadership that is common in Ukraine. All this led to severe morale problems.

A major reason why the Russian military effort in Ukraine failed was that the morale of most Russians was low while Ukrainians were more motivated to fight and do it more effectively. In some ways, this was a curious situation. Troops on both sides are ethnic Russian. While Ukrainians use their own version, or dialect of Russian, this does not prevent Russians and Ukrainians from carrying on discussions with each other. The situation is similar in other cultures.

Troops from both sides being able to talk to each other diminished the usual wartime efforts to portray enemy troops as some kind of alien monster. Russian troops in Ukraine were treated poorly by their leaders. Initially Russian soldiers were sent to Ukraine without knowing they were no longer in Russia and in a neighboring country where invaders were being fiercely and successfully resisted. Many junior Russian officers weren’t told the truth. When it became obvious to the surviving Russian troops what was going on, morale and willingness to fight declined sharply. Ukrainian troops were better off when it came to morale, although most were not happy about finding themselves armed and fighting Russians. The initial Ukrainian defenders were active duty troops belonging to the army or newly created national guard. These men, and some women, paid attention to their training and had better morale, cohesion and effectiveness in combat.

Most Russian troops had little training. The main exceptions were the few special operations or airborne units. The combination of low morale and little training resulted in soldiers who were reluctant to fight and prone to flee. The only reliable combat troops were the small number of special operations, airborne or mercenary (Wagner Group) personnel available.

The Ukrainian approach was different. An effort was made, and often carried out, to see that all Ukrainian combat troops were properly trained and equipped. It was difficult to take the time to train new troops when more fighters were desperately needed on the front lines. The Ukrainians made an effort, and often succeeded in overcoming this problem by doing most of the training during the winter or any other time where there was a lull in the fighting. A lot of training was done outside Ukraine, usually in NATO countries. Soon almost all new Russian troops sent to Ukraine have had little or no training. That means the Russians suffer exceptionally high casualties and the Ukrainians lose far fewer men.

Better training and often superior weapons and equipment not only resulted in improved Ukrainian morale but also much more effective troops. This is why Ukrainian forces are now on the offensive and overcoming Russian efforts to halt the advance. While Russian leaders insist that Russia will never give up efforts to conquer Ukraine, few Russian troops are willing or able to make it work. The Ukrainians have the morale, weapons and incentives to force the Russians out.

July 2, 2023: Russia sent special operations (Spetsnaz) troops to the border between Belgorod province and Ukraine to deal with continuing raids by anti-Putin Russian militias based in Ukraine. These raids have been going on for several months and embarrass Russia by demonstrating its lack of border security. This is common because Russia has over 22,000 kilometers of land borders, mostly with little or no border security. This includes nearly 2,000 kilometers of border with Ukraine and 540 kilometers of that is in the Belgorod area. Russia has also sent special operations troops to upgrade defenses on the rest of the border with Ukraine in Kursk and Bryansk provinces.

The raids on the Belgorod are meant to embarrass Putin, not kill Russian soldiers and civilians. Some of the Russian responses to the raids did that too, notably because the forces involved acted like Russian troops everywhere, often bombing and using artillery in civilian areas, looting of Russian civilians and so on.. Most of the responses against the Ukrainian-backed Russian militias were ineffectual, which is typical of the Russian Army Putin has created to fight in Ukraine. The Belgorod border is north of the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv. Initially these raids faced no armed opposition. When Russian security forces showed during more recent raids, the Russian troops either retreated or surrendered when confronted by the raiders. This was not unexpected because Russian troops in Ukraine have performed poorly from the beginning. Worse, the raiders were all Russians who, unlike most Russian army personnel in Ukraine, were competent and effective fighters whose motivation was to discredit Vladimir Putin and his war in Ukraine. In response to this the best Russia could do was send about a hundred special operations troops to Belgorod in an effort to increase the effectiveness of the additional border forces already at the border. These Spetsnaz, however, were only more of the same poorly trained and led conscripts who offered no effective resistance to the raiders and behaved badly towards Russian civilians.