The Surprisingly Untold Story of the Punic Wars at Sea

The literature on the Punic Wars (264-146 BC) is voluminous and has been ongoing since antiquity, and yet one wonders if there is anything new left to say about these conflicts. Christa Steinby’s work, Rome versus Carthage: The War at Sea is a significant and important new contribution to the scholarship on the Punic Wars. The author offers a unique and refreshing perspective on our understanding of the wars between Rome and Carthage by challenging traditional notions regarding the maritime capabilities of Rome at the time of its confrontation with Carthage. Steinby shows that, far from being a solely agrarian based economy, Rome, like other communities along the coastline of the Tyrrhenian Sea, historically maintained an active and lucrative maritime trade network with its western Mediterranean neighbors from the city’s foundation, and that this trade not only greatly enhanced the overall prosperity of the city but also led to Rome’s growth as a significant regional power in Italy. Evidence for this trade can also be found in the series of treaties concluded between Rome and Carthage from 509 BC to 279 BC which, among other provisions, specified the areas and Carthaginian ports to which Roman ships could sail and conduct business. Such trade also required Rome to maintain an active fleet for its protection by occasionally engaging in naval conflict with its rivals well before the Punic Wars. In fact, the Romans established the offices of duoviri navales, commissioners in charge of building and maintaining the fleet, as early as 311 BC, and the creation of these offices probably corresponded with the introduction of triremes into the Roman navy, advanced warships that required considerable infrastructure and financing to build and maintain.

Steinby argues that traditional scholarship has tended to rely too heavily on the work of the Greek historian Polybius, who wrote our only complete surviving account of the First Punic War. Polybius is the ultimate source of the hoary notion that the Romans were landlubbers and only took to the sea by necessity, in order to defeat the Carthaginians at their own game. In this respect, Polybius got it wrong, for what probably happened at this time was not the creation of the Roman navy, but the introduction of the quadrireme and quinquereme into the Roman fleet. In this regard, Polybius’ characterization of the Romans as novices at sea demonstrates the limits of his understanding of earlier Roman history, which is not surprising given that he was far removed in time from those events while he was doing his research. Following Polybius’ lead, historians have also assumed that after defeating Carthage in the first conflict, the Romans lost interest in maintaining a major naval presence in the Mediterranean and returned to their landlubberly ways and so did not make much use of naval forces in the subsequent conflicts with Carthage or in her later wars with the Hellenistic monarchies in Macedon and Syria. On the contrary, Steinby notes that the Romans and their allies brought such overwhelming naval power to bear in the first two wars against Macedon that the Macedonian fleet did not dare to challenge it. Despite these facts, writers have tended to ignore literary, archaeological, numismatic, and even monumental evidence for Roman naval activities in the period before the conflict with Carthage.

Relations between Rome and Carthage date back to the sixth century BC but grew increasingly strained as Rome became more powerful at sea in the fourth century BC. In fact, Roman naval activity increased markedly in the ninety years leading up to the First Punic War, during which time Rome used its navy to transport troops and conduct raids along the Tyrrhenian coast. It was also during this time that the Romans started commemorating naval victories by placing the captured rams of enemy warships on display, most notably on the Rostra in the Forum in 338 BC. Also during this time the city of Naples became the first Roman ally to be designated a socius navalis, a supplier of ships to the Roman navy which included Roman access to important naval bases in the Bay of Naples. Roman naval strength and infrastructure continued to grow until the very eve of the war with Carthage, suggesting that the Romans were already anticipating and preparing for an eventual conflict with Carthage well before 264 BC. In light of these considerations, Steinby argues that the First Punic War is better regarded as a conflict in which two competing naval powers vied with each other for dominance. The naval resources committed by both sides to this fight were unprecedented, especially for the Carthaginians, who, in contrast with their earlier conflicts with Pyrrhus of Epirus and Agathocles of Syracuse, were forced to contend with the Romans on a scale that they were not accustomed to. Roman victory was ultimately due to the ability of the Romans to continuously mobilize large naval forces, even after suffering cataclysmic losses. Rome’s ability to replenish her forces, coupled with the repeated success of Roman fleets in naval combat against Carthage, resulted in the steady loss of Punic warships that turned the First Punic War into an attritional conflict that Carthage could not sustain.

Our misunderstanding of Roman naval policy has also affected the historiographic discussion of the Second Punic War, which tends to focus almost exclusively on the campaigns of the land armies, especially those of Hannibal, with little attention to naval affairs. Steinby shows that naval operations played a significant role in the ultimate outcome of the war as Carthage was able to mount a significant challenge to Roman control of the seas which forced the Romans to deploy sizable naval assets to meet this threat. Given the number of theaters over which the struggle was waged, which included Italy, Spain, Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and the Adriatic, the Second Punic War became ‘a full war at sea.’ Although the Second Punic War did not witness any massive naval battles on the scale of those fought in the First Punic War, naval forces played an important role in the conflict as land and naval forces often acted in concert with one another. Such practices largely stemmed from the limited stowage capacity of ancient warships which were forced to operate close to the shore for regular resupply and therefore made control of harbors essential for logistical support in combined operations. In fact, most naval battles during this conflict were fought over control of anchorages and strategic harbors, essential for the control of coastlines which, in turn, made land operations possible. In addition to transporting troops and supplies, fleets also conducted raids, blockaded ports, and even participated in sieges. Ships crews were expected to act as soldiers and often supplemented land based formations.

Maritime logistical considerations were a major factor in the strategies adopted by the belligerents. Hannibal’s decision to march his army overland from Spain to Italy was not due to the weakness of the Carthaginian fleet, which was capable of providing sufficient waterborne transport to his army but was based on the reality that the Romans controlled most of the coastline between Spain and northern Italy which made it impossible for the Carthaginians to carry out such an operation. Nevertheless, from the very beginning of the conflict, the Punic fleet was active at sea by taking the initiative in providing direct contact and support between Spain and Carthage, and attacking Roman controlled ports in Sicily, Sardinia, and the coast of Italy. The Carthaginians prioritized seizing a naval base in Sicily which would have allowed them to provide regular reinforcements and supplies to Hannibal in Italy, which suggests that this was a key part of the original Carthaginian strategy for the war. In addition, once inside Italy, Hannibal planned to secure control of ports along the Tyrrhenian coast which would have enabled him to coordinate with Carthaginian fleets for logistical support and reinforcements. Hannibal was only able to achieve this goal in the aftermath of Cannae when many southern Italian communities defected to his cause. Hannibal also conducted extensive operations to seize additional harbors, including the major port of Tarentum. This success was largely due to the absence of a Roman naval presence in the city, thanks to pressure exerted by the Carthaginian navy on other fronts. Yet, despite these successes, the Carthaginians were unable to effect meaningful coordination between the army in Italy and the fleet, and there is only one known instance in which reinforcements reached Hannibal from Africa.

The Romans, for their part, relied heavily on their fleets to provide support to the armies operating in Spain and largely confined themselves to operations designed to secure control of the Spanish coastline. In addition, the entry of Macedon into the conflict forced the Romans to deploy naval assets to the Adriatic where, in conjunction with their Hellenic allies, they were able to prevent Philip V from intervening in the war in Italy. Roman fleets were integral to the Roman effort in Sicily and played a decisive role in the siege of Syracuse in 212 BC by warding off Punic naval support of the Syracusans. The Romans also conducted regular raids on the African coast from which they were able to seize considerable plunder. Ultimate victory would only come when a Roman army under Scipio Africanus invaded Punic territory, thereby taking the war to Carthage’s homeland. However, such an operation would not have been feasible without Roman naval dominance, which they achieved in 207 BC, thereby leading to a swift conclusion to the conflict.

Overall Steinby’s work serves as a welcome addition to the vast literature on the Punic Wars by casting a fascinating light on the importance of naval forces in the conduct of these conflicts. Through careful narration and incisive analysis of the various military operations, Steinby convincingly demonstrates that control of the seas was crucial for Rome’s final victory over Carthage. Rome Versus Carthage is essential reading for anyone wishing to further deepen their knowledge of an often overlooked aspect of the wars between Rome and Carthage.

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Our Reviewer: Dr. John Shean is an Associate Professor of History at La Guardia Community College, CUNY. He has written extensively in history, including Soldiering for God: Christianity and the Roman Army. His previous reviews for include The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today, Constantine and the Cities, and Christian Emperors and Roman Elites in Late Antiquity.

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