Short Rounds

"Operation Wedlock"

In June of 1942, during the Midway Campaign, strong Japanese forces captured Attu and Kiska, at the westernmost end of the Aleutian Islands.

This "threat" to Alaska set in train a protracted campaign to regain the two islands.  In the months following, strong American and Canadian forces  began concentrating in Alaska in anticipation of blocking further Japanese advances and then recovering the islands.  Of course the almost complete lack of infrastructure in Alaska and the Aleutians required an enormous investment, and that took time.  Nevertheless, in May of 1943 Attu was successfully recovered, and two months later the Japanese quietly withdrew from Kiska; so quietly, in fact, that the U.S. didn't realize what had happened until several days after a major amphibious landing took place on the island, with contingent casualties among the troops due to "friendly fire."

Having cleared the Aleutians of the Japanese, some American and Canadian military planners thought about using the islands as a base for amphibious operations against the Kuriles, the northernmost islands in Japan.  Preliminary planning soon demonstrated the futility of such an undertaking, given the environmental obstacles, and so from then until the end of the war operations in the theater were largely characterized by occasional air raids against northern Japan and, once or twice, a sortie by American surface forces to shoot up coastal installations. 

But the Allied planners also realized that since they had thought about the possibility of an attack on Japan from the Aleutians, the Japanese might also be concerned about the possibility.  So they initiated "Operation Wedlock," one of the most successful deceptions of the Pacific War.

"Operation Wedlock" was an elaborate scheme to convince the Japanese that the Aleutians were to be the staging point for a major US-Canadian offensive was planned against the Kurile Islands in 1944 or 1945.  So even as very real Allied forces in the northern areas were cut drastically from over one hundred thousand to only about half that, "strong" notional forces were stationed there.

A largely notional Ninth Fleet was established, with a supporting IX Amphibious Command that supposedly controlled five American (108^th, 119^th, 130^th, 141^st, and 157^th Infantry Divisions, all bogus but with officially announced insignia, etc.), with hints of participation by some Canadian ground forces.  Small numbers of troops were assigned to produce volumes of dummy radio traffic appropriate to the large forces supposedly in the area, while dummy bases were set up on Attu, complete with concentrations of dummy landing craft, and occasional "rehearsals" for landings were held, and hints were dropped in the press about large orders for arctic gear and specialized equipment.  Meanwhile the date for the invasion was set and then reset several times, each time "leaked" to the enemy through double agents purportedly working for Germany or to Soviet fishermen making occasional stops, who would often later be intercepted by Japanese patrols.  In addition, American troops shipping out from West Coast ports were often issued winter underwear and the shoulder patches of units “stationed” in Alaska in the furtherance of this deception.

The ruse worked very well.  During 1944 the Japanese estimated the number of Allied troops in Alaska at over 400,000, supported by some 700 aircraft and a very strong naval force, when in fact personnel had fallen to about 65,000 troops, with about 350 aircraft and only a half-dozen warships.  Meanwhile the Japanese increased their forces in the Kuriles from about 14,000 to over 80,000, and in the northernmost islands from about 8,000 to over 40,000, while several hundred aircraft were held in northern Japan for contingencies in the Kuriles

Operation Wedlock was useful in forcing the Japanese to spread themselves a little thinner during 1943, but it may have been most valuable in mid-1944.  While preparing for his campaign in the Marianas and Guam in mid-1944 CINCPAC Chester W. Nimitz had laid on a deception that suggested shipping limitations would impede any American operations in the Central Pacific by several months.  This coincided with the peak of deception activity in the Aleutians, where bogus preparations were at fever pitch for a D-Day of August 15^th in the Kuriles.   As a result, the Japanese transferred strong air forces to the Kuriles, raising air strength there from fewer than 50 to nearly 600 aircraft, aircraft which were not available for operations against Nimitz when he struck the Marianas in June

A Very Pleasant Field Day

In 1781, Prince Frederick, the Duke of York and Albany (1763-1827), who had been gazetted colonel in the British Army the previous year, was dispatched by his Royal Father, George III, to his dad’s other kingdom, Hanover, for several years to improve his education.  Until 1787, the young prince lived in Hanover, studying at the University of Gottingen, where he indulged in vices not unknown to collegians today, and also popped in from time to time on various armies, including the Austrian and Prussian, to learn soldiering.

Naturally, the  young prince was introduced to Frederick the Great of Prussia (r. 1740-1786), the premiere general of the age, though in truth he'd managed to avoid any serious fighting since 1763. 

Now Frederick was the first modern general to hold regular maneuvers.  And so the young prince was on several occasions a guest at the Prussian Army's annual maneuvers, held in Silesia.

One year, while the prince was at the king's side, the troops performed their evolutions and mock battles rather poorly.  The king was not impressed.  In fact, Frederick thought the maneuver were conducted so badly he declared, "Were I to make generals of shoemakers and tailors the regiments could not be worse," and placed several officers under arrest.  The king didn't stop there.  He said the men of Freiherr von Erlach's 40^th Fusiliers, "looked like smugglers and marched like cabbages and turnips."  

Prince Frederick came back from Germany in 1787 and undertook various duties appropriate to his station, while being regularly promoted in the British Army.  In 1793 he proved himself a poor commander during operations in the Netherlands.*  Despite his lack of success in the field, which, in truth was only partially his fault, given impossible instructions and a host of insubordinate subordinates, in 1795 the young Duke was appointed head of the entire British Army.

In this role he proved a major reformer, helping to introduce Prussian drill into the British Army, insisting that commissions could not be purchased for anyone who lacked six years' service with the colors, improving living conditions for enlister personnel and military dependents, and more.

It was largely the work of the Duke of York, who remained in office from 1795 though 1809 and again from 1811 until his death, that Britain fielded the armies that men like Wellington used to defeat Napoleon.

The grand old Duke of York,

He had ten thousand men.

He marched them up to the top of the hill

And he marched them down again.

And when they were up, they were up.

And when they were down, they were down.

And when they were only halfway up

They were neither up nor down.